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COOPERATIVE CLUSTERING MODELS FOR 
VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS 
OMAR MOHAMMAD ABDEL WAHAB 
Abstract 
In this thesis, we address the problem of clustering in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) 
using QoS-OLSR protocol in the presence of selfish nodes. The QoS-OLSR is a clustering 
protocol that aims to prolong the network lifetime in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) by 
considering the bandwidth and energy parameters to calculate the Quality of Service (QoS) 
metrics.  However, this protocol ignores the mobility metrics that characterize the vehicular 
topology. In fact, the high mobility of vehicles leads to frequent disconnections in the clusters 
and alters the QoS over the network. Moreover, the presence of selfish nodes would hinder the 
application of any clustering model. These nodes behave rationally and tend hence to 
maximize their gain regardless of the negative implications that may affect the network. Thus, 
this thesis is concerned with introducing a clustering model that aims to form stable clusters 
and maintain the stability during communications and link failures, while satisfying the 
Quality of Service requirements. This is achieved by (1) considering the high mobility metrics 
while computing the QoS, (2) using Ant Colony Optimization for MPRs selection, and (3) 
using MPR recovery algorithm that is able to select alternatives and keep the network 
connected in case of link failures. Moreover, the clustering model is accompanied with a 
Dempster-Shafer based model that detects the misbehaving vehicles and regulates the 
cooperation by (1) using cooperative watchdog model where evidences are collected by the 
different watchdogs and aggregated using Dempster-Shafer to make the final decisions, and 
(2) punishing the misbehaving vehicles by the different network nodes. Mathematical analysis 
and simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed models. 
Keywords: Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET); Quality of service (QoS); Ant Colony 
Optimization (ACO); QoS-OLSR; Game Theory; Dempster-Shafer; Tit-for-Tat. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations
Safety systems are becoming nowadays an attractive topic for the research community with
the increase in the number of traffic accidents and the complexity of the roads infrastruc-
ture. Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is a new class of wireless networks that allows
the communications among neighboring vehicles and between vehicles and nearby road-
side infrastructure such as traffic lights and command centers. This technology offers a
wide set of applications and services ranging from safety applications and traffic manage-
ment systems to commercial and marketing services.
The basic point in such kind of networks is building efficient and secure communica-
tions. The clustering is one of the most important tasks in VANET that is concerned with
organizing and optimizing the communications. It starts with the architecture of the net-
work and covers the problems of routing and overhead. The existing clustering models
dedicated to VANET such as [20, 21, 23, 24] are unilateral in the sense that they focus on
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some VANET-specific features and ignore others such as bandwidth and connectivity. In
other words, the current VANET clustering models consider exclusively the mobility pa-
rameters such as speed, distance, and direction, while ignoring the networking aspects of
VANET. Safety, emergency, and multimedia applications of VANET require to assure a
high level of Quality of Service (QoS) through the network. Practically, VANET requires
real-time message propagation that is able to deliver data in a timely and accurate manner.
For example, considering the case of safety applications, any delay in the message delivery
may entrain dangerous and mortal accidents. Similarly, exchanging multimedia services
such as files and video streams requires a high level of QoS.
Moreover, proposing a clustering model is not enough. Ensuring the proper implemen-
tation of the model is as important as the model itself. The interests of the model parties
may contradict with the model objectives. Concretely, the vehicles are driven by humans
who have selfish or rational thinking. During clusters formation, some drivers may derail
the protocol principles and turn them to their advantage. Some others may prefer to save
their time and resources by not following the model rules after clusters formation. Nu-
merous contributions have been advanced to cope with these misbehaving vehicles. They
can be categorized into two categories: incentive-based and detection-based mechanisms.
Nonetheless, both of them suffer from several shortcomings that limit their efficiency such
as lack of scalability and centralization, ambiguous collisions, and false alarms.
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1.2 Problem Statement
In this thesis, we consider the case of Vehicular Ad hoc Network where a set of vehicles
needs to form stable clusters and maintain the stability during the communications and in
case of link failures. When achieving these goals, several problems arise. First, the high
mobility of the vehicles may lead to a frequent and sometimes immediate disconnection of
clusters. Suppose, for example a vehicle x, which is driving with a velocity of 120 km/h
and willing to stop after 130 meters, has the highest QoS value in terms of bandwidth,
connectivity and energy. If we use the existing QoS-based clustering algorithms such as
QOLSR [2] and QoS-OLSR [17], they perform the clustering by electing a cluster-head
for each set of neighbor nodes. The cluster-heads are responsible then of electing a set
of nodes called Multi-points relay (MPRs) that connect the clusters. According to these
algorithms, which consider only the energy and bandwidth parameters, the vehicle x will
be elected as a cluster-head and has a high chance to be selected as MPR. However, this
vehicle will stop after a short time and withdraw from the network, which would result
in cluster disconnection. Second, the link failures in VANET are likely to occur. Thus,
launching the MPRs selection whenever a failure happens would lead to wide overhead
due to the exchange of a large set of messages.
Based on this, it is clear that the following objectives must be achieved to ensure the
stability of the network. First, the clusters formation should take into consideration a trade-
off between the Quality of Service (i.e. bandwidth, End-to-End delay, and Packet Deliver
Ratio) and the mobility metrics (i.e. speed and residual distance). Second, there should be
a MPR recovery algorithm that is able to provide quick alternatives and avoid the frequent
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re-elections in case of link failures.
Moreover, each clustering model should be accompanied with the following question:
“are the vehicles really willing to follow or to participate in the clustering model?”. In
fact, some vehicles (heads and MPRs) may have a selfish thinking that pushes them to stop
collaborating with other nodes. These nodes seek to realize their own objectives regard-
less of the bad consequences that may result. This thinking stems from the fact that some
driver prefer to over-speed (go beyond the maximum allowed speed) the other vehicles and
get to the destination as earlier as they can. Others can also under-speed (drive below the
minimum speed) for several purposes. Such behavior is known as passive attack since it
would lead to denial of service due to not contributing in the routing process. This behav-
ior, which aims only to satisfy the driver’s demands, does not seek to harm the network
functioning on purpose. However, this does not mean that such behaviors do not induce
dangerous implications.
Assume for example that a node serving as MPR between two clusters decided to over
or under speed. This may entail catastrophic implications in the sense that (1) the number
of elected MPRs increases frantically due to the need of frequent MPRs reelections that
increases the jamming over the network, (2) the network stability, measured as current
number of nodes in each cluster divided by the previous number of nodes that was in it,
deteriorates effectively and the number of clusters’ disconnections will hence be high, (3)
the end-to-end delay or the average number of hops needed to transfer data between the
source and the destination is strongly increased by the fact that the path will not stand
up more than few seconds, and (4) the bandwidth allocation will suffer from recurrent
disconnections.
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In this context, several approaches have been advanced to detect and punish the misbe-
having nodes. The existing approaches assume that each node can serve as a watchdog to
monitor the behavior of its neighbor node. In the light of its observations, the node then
decides to cooperate or not. These mechanisms rely on the node-to-node relation and are
able hence to penalize individual nodes, but not to regulate the cooperation in the whole
network. In fact, several vehicles may cooperate with some nodes and refrain from cooper-
ating with other nodes. Therefore, the observations of single watchdogs are not sufficient
to judge the behavior of the other nodes. Moreover, the noise caused by the channel col-
lisions and the high mobility of vehicles may affect the observations of the watchdogs. It
may happen, for instance, that some packets are not received within the expected time due
to intentional or unintentional network collisions.
In this case, the watchdog may accuse cooperative nodes to be misbehaving unjustly.
Besides, some other watchdogs may accuse cooperative vehicles to be misbehaving un-
justly with the intention of excluding them from being competitors in any future election
procedure. All these problems contribute in decreasing the efficiency of detection and in-
creasing the false alarms. Thus, the opinion of individual watchdog nodes is not sufficient.
This raises the need for a cooperative approach that can improve the detection and regulate
the cooperation in the presence of high mobility and channel collisions.
In summary, the problems tackled in this thesis can be listed as follows:
 Maintain the stability of the clusters during communications and in case of link fail-
ures without sacrificing the Quality of Service requirements.
 Improve the detection of misbehaving vehicles in the presence of channel collisions
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and high mobility.
 Regulate the cooperation in the presence of rational nodes that present forged evi-
dences.
1.3 Objectives
The main goal of this thesis is a to develop a QoS-based clustering model that forms stable
clusters, while maintaining the Quality of Service and elaborate a repeated game theory that
ensures the faithful implementation of the clustering model. In summary, the objectives of
our approach can be listed as follows:
 Form stable clusters and maintain the stability of the network while keeping a good
level of Quality of Service.
 Detect the misbehavior after clusters formation and improve the accuracy of the de-
cisions.
 Regulate the cooperation in the network by punishing the misbehaving vehicles and
rewarding the cooperative ones.
1.4 Approach Overview and Contributions
In this thesis, we propose a clustering model that optimizes the communications in Vehicu-
lar Ad Hoc Networks. Our clustering model is able to reduce the communications overhead
by assigning the routing responsibilities to a specialized set of nodes called cluster-heads
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and Multi-Point Relays (MPRs) instead of flooding the network by unnecessary messages.
These nodes are elected according to an ant colony optimization algorithm responsible for
identifying the optimal set of nodes that achieves the best path. The optimal set is charac-
terized by both high level of QoS and acceptable level of mobility. The QoS is considered
to ensure that these nodes are eligible to assume the routing responsibilities and deliver
the packets in an accurate and timely manner. Therefore, we consider the bandwidth and
connectivity parameters while electing these nodes.
The high mobility in VANET is an important issue that cannot be neglected while elect-
ing the head and MPR nodes. In fact, to perform the routing responsibilities perfectly, the
nodes have to be respecting the speed limits since driving with a very high or very low mo-
bility will induce frequent clusters disconnections and cause packet losses. Therefore, we
consider the distance and velocity parameters while designating the optimal set of nodes.
The Ant Colony Optimization algorithm is responsible for launching a proactive discovery
to select the best paths achieving the aforementioned parameters. Thus, the ACO algo-
rithm is able to maintain the stability of the clusters during communications by selecting
long-living paths without sacrificing the QoS requirements.
To guarantee the proper application of the clustering model, we consider the problem
of selfish or misbehaving vehicles after clusters formations. These nodes may impede the
implementation of the proposed clustering models by refusing to follow the protocol rules.
Practically, some drivers may consider that their cooperation in the clustering missions
contradicts their own interests in the sense that they spend their time and resources without
receiving any return. Therefore, we propose a detection mechanism dedicated to identify
the misbehaving nodes that perform their misbehavior in the network. The detection is
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done in a cooperative manner in order to collect the larger possible set of evidences and
increase hence the credibility of the decisions. The aggregation of these evidences is done
then using Dempster-Shafer theory to prevent the untrustworthy and uncertain observations
from spoiling the decisions, as well as to overcome the problems of ambiguity and false
alarms caused by the channel collisions and high mobility.
In the light of the decisions resulting from the detection mechanism, we model a game
theory based on the Tit-for-Tat strategy to regulate the cooperation in the network. This
game aims to convince the vehicles that their interest lies by cooperating in the networking
functions and that refraining from cooperating would result in a loss for them. This is done
by punishing the misbehaving vehicles by the different network nodes and rewarding the
cooperative vehicles by the different nodes. Thus, the vehicles would tend to cooperate with
the different network nodes to avoid the severe punishment resulting from the cooperative
detection model.
The contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. Extend the network lifetime and maintain the QoS requirements by introducing a
QoS-based clustering algorithm that considers the mobility metrics.
2. Enhance the End-to-End delay and the Packet Delivery Ratio by selecting the MPR
nodes using Ant Colony Optimization (ACO).
3. Reduce the communications overhead by introducing a MPR recovery algorithm that
is able to select alternative MPRs in case of link failures.
4. Detect the misbehaving vehicles after clusters formation by using cooperative watch-
dogs monitoring for evidences collection and Dempster-Shafer theory for evidences
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aggregation.
5. Regulate the cooperation in VANET by rewarding the cooperative vehicles and pun-
ishing the misbehaving ones.
6. Reduce the time and overhead of detection by using the information dissemination
approach to propagate the detection results.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The remaining of the thesis is organized as following:
In Chapter 2, we give an overview on the main concepts that form our thesis such as:
Ant Colony Optimization, Dempster-Shafer, and repeated game theory. We present then the
related works in the fields of clustering, routing, and security in both mobile and vehicular
ad hoc networks.
In Chapter 3, we present our proposed clustering model. After the clusters formation,
we develop a routing algorithm based on Ant Colony Optimization. To better explain how
the clustering and routing algorithms work concretely, we give an illustrative example that
mimics a real vehicular network. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithms using mathematical analysis and simulation results. In addition, we explain in
details the scenario and parameters followed during simulations.
In Chapter 4, we present the VANET-DSD model that is proposed to deal with the
selfish vehicles. Thereafter, we evaluate the performance of the proposed model using
simulations and give an illustrative example to show how this model works.
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In Chapter 5, we provide the conclusion of this thesis, recapitulate its contributions,
announce the plans for future work, and present the list of publications and submissions
derived from this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background & Related Work
2.1 Introduction
We present in this chapter a general idea on the concepts that form our models. Our cluster-
ing model is based on Ant Colony Optimization algorithm that is responsible for a proactive
discovery to select the optimal set of nodes that are able to guarantee the best path in terms
of both Quality of Service and mobility. We explain hence how the Ant Colony Optimiza-
tion (ACO) algorithm works and we give an illustrative example to show the efficiency
of such algorithm for the routing issues. Moreover, the thesis uses the Dempster-Shafer
theory to aggregate the evidences while detecting the misbehaving vehicles. Therefore, we
provide an overview on this theory and show the motivation behind using it for evidences
aggregation. To regulate the cooperation in VANET and ensure the faithful application of
the proposed clustering model, a repeated game theory is employed. Thus, we give a def-
inition of the game theory and show the importance of this field to analyze the interaction
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among vehicles and enforce the cooperation. Finally, a summary of the main research con-
tributions in the areas of clustering, routing, and security in both MANET and VANET is
provided to show the need of our contribution and how it is different.
2.2 Ant Colony Optimization
Ant Colony Optimization is a probabilistic approach that is used to solve several discrete
optimization problems. This approach inherits the normal behavior of ants that tend to find
the shortest route while searching for food. In fact, the ants that move randomly towards
the food indicate the other ants the shortest path to follow by depositing chemical substance
called pheromone. Thereafter, paths with higher pheromone values are chosen to be fol-
lowed. Thus, the shortest path will be continuously reinforced by more pheromone values
since it will get marched repeatedly by the ants [12]. In contrary, the pheromone trails of
the not marched paths will decrease due to the evaporation process. The evaporation is
important to avoid the convergence for local optimal solution since without evaporation,
the routes marched by the first ants will be extremely attractive for the following ants. The
behavior of ants has attracted the researchers due to its dynamic nature that makes it adap-
tive to changes in real-time applications. Therefore, it has been widely used to solve many
problems such as vehicle routing, Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), machine scheduling,
telecommunication networks, ad hoc networks routing, and personnel placement in airline
companies.
To illustrate how the Ant Colony Optimization algorithm works, we show in the fol-
lowing how ACO can be applied to solve the TSP, which is a routing problem. Given a set
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of cities and the distances separating each pair of cities, the problem of TSP is concerned
with finding the shortest path that visits each city just once and turns back to the original
city. This problem could be modeled as a construction graph where the cities represent the
vertices and the distances separating the cities are the edges. The ACO solution works as
follows: initially, every ant begins from a randomly selected vertex (city). Next, ants choose
their next vertex to get in a probabilistic manner according to the highest pheromone value.
This process continues until each ant has visited all the vertices on the graph only once.
Now, pheromone values are updated on all the edges according to the quality of solution to
which they belong so that the pheromone values for shorter routes would be greater than
other routes. Thereafter, the pheromone values begin to evaporate and only the short tours
will be reinforced by more pheromone values. This process is repeated for a specified num-
ber of iterations and the best discovered tour is maintained as final solution. This process
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
D
S
D
S
D
S
Figure 1: Ant Colony Optimization
In this thesis, the clusters in VANET have to communicate with each other in order to
exchange packets and information. Therefore, a routing algorithm is needed. To guarantee
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choosing the optimal paths in terms of QoS, mobility, and delay, an Ant Colony Optimiza-
tion algorithm is used where proactive discovery by ant agents is initiated the find the best
paths.
2.3 Dempster-Shafer
Dempster-Shafer is a mathematical theory elaborated by Arthur P. Dempster and Glenn
Shafer [44]. This theory combines evidences from independent sources to come up with
a degree of belief (belief function). It relies on two main ideas: (1) acquiring degrees of
belief from subjective probabilities, and (2) combining these beliefs.
To illustrate how these two ideas work. As an example, let us assume that the subjective
probabilities for the trustworthiness of Doctor John are known. The probability that John
is trustworthy is 0:9 while the probability that he is untrustworthy is 0:1. Suppose that
John says that a patient, Bob, suffers from diabetes. This allegation must be true if John
is trustworthy but not necessarily false if he is untrustworthy. Thus, his testimony alone
justifies a 0:9 degree of belief that Bob suffers from diabetes, but only a zero degree of
belief (not a 0:1) that Bob is healthy. This zero does not imply that we are sure that Bob
does not suffer from diabetes, but simply implies that John’s testimony gives no reason to
believe that Bob is healthy. The 0:9 and the zero together form a belief function.
In order to explain how the combination rule for degrees of belief works, we suppose
that we know another doctor, called Alice, and that Alice is trustworthy with probability
of 0:9 and untrustworthy with probability of 0:1. Assume that Alice witnesses as well
that Bob suffers from diabetes. Since the trustworthiness of John is independent from
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the trustworthiness of Alice, we may multiply the probabilities of these two events. The
probability that both are trustworthy is 0:9 0:9 = 0:81. The probability that neither John
nor Alice is trustworthy will be 0:1 0:1 = 0:01. Finally, the likelihood that at least one is
trustworthy is 1   0:01 = 0:99. Since both doctors said that Bob suffers from diabetes, at
least of them being trustworthy means that Bob really suffers from diabetes, and we may
hence assign this event a degree of belief of 0:99 as explained before.
On the other hand, if John’s and Alice’s testimonies were contradictory in the sense
that john says that Bob suffers from diabetes while Alice says that he does not. Now, both
cannot be right and hence cannot be both trustworthy. The prior probabilities that only John
is trustworthy, only Alice is trustworthy, and that neither is trustworthy are 0:09, 0:09, and
0:01, respectively, and the posterior probabilities (given that not both are trustworthy) are
9
19
, 9
19
, and 1
19
, respectively. Hence we have a 9
19
degree of belief that Bob suffers from di-
abetes (because John is trustworthy) and a 9
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degree of belief that Bob is sound and healthy
(because Alice is trustworthy). Thus, Dempster-Shafer gives a weight for each evidence
according to the trustworthiness level of the person giving the evidence and is necessary
hence to discount evidences from untrustworthy observers upon aggregating the different
testimonies. This appealing feature motivated us to use Dempster-Shafer while detecting
the misbehaving vehicles since we are proposing a cooperative detection mechanism where
evidences from different sources need to be aggregated. Therefore, Dempster-Shafer can
be a solution to come up with reliable and credible decisions.
Another important characteristic of Dempster-Shafer is that it supports uncertain evi-
dences. Suppose, for example, that Alice and John witness that a thief got in Bob’s home.
However, they might both heard the voice of a noise coming from a cat and thought it is
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coming from a thief. To express this uncertainty, Bob can consider three evidences: (1) evi-
dence for Alice’s trustworthiness, (2) evidence for John’s trustworthiness, and (3) evidence
for the possibility of the presence of a cat. Now, Bob can combine these three items of ev-
idences through Dempster’s rule of combination to come up with the final decision taking
into consideration that both observers may be unreliable. This feature can be exploited to
improve the detection for misbehaving vehicles in VANET and overcome the problem of
ambiguity caused by the high mobility of the vehicles and the channel collisions.
2.4 Repeated Game Theory
Game theory is a formal study of conflict and cooperation that applies whenever the actions
of several peers are interdependent in the sense that the strategy of one game’s component
depends on the action of another game component [35]. The motivation behind using game
theory is arriving at optimal decision. Consider, for example, that a company decides to
reduce prices in order to augment its profit. Without considering the other players’ (com-
panies) actions, this action may be counterproductive and the company will lose money
if the other companies apply a policy of price cuts. Here lies the importance of consider-
ing the different parties’ strategies upon building any strategy. Game theoretical concepts
have been widely used to solve problems in the fields of economy, biology, military, and
computer science. To be clear and meaningful, each game should describe seven principal
elements: players, actions, information, strategies, outcomes, payoff, and equilibrium. The
players are the game parties that are responsible for making decisions. The actions are
the set of options from which the players have to choose. The information represents the
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learning of the player upon making decision. The strategies describe the set of principles
that control the decisions of the player at each stage of the game. The outcomes are the
expected or desired output of the game such as increase in profits. The payoffs describe
the utilities yielded by the player in a specific outcome. Finally, the equilibrium represents
a stable solution in which no player has an interest to take unilateral decisions and change
his strategy.
Repeated game is a type of game theory in which players repeat their actions over and
over again. To show the importance of using repeated game models, we present a motivat-
ing example based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma [37]. The Prisoner’s Dilemma models the
investigation in a crime where two prisoners suspected to be committed a crime together
are arrested. The investigator isolates them and suggests a deal saying: (1) if one of them
confesses against the other one, the confessor will get free (payoff: 0) and the offender
will spend 4 years in prison (payoff: 4), (2) if they both confess, they will bear a less cruel
punishment by being jailed 3 years (payoff: 3), (3) if they both decline to confess, they will
both bear a reduced sentence lack of evidences (payoff: 1). This deal can be summarized
in the following bimatrix:
Confess Don’t Confess
Confess (3; 3) (0; 4)
Don’t Confess (4; 0) (1; 1)
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The question is: how should the prisoners behave in such game? Each prisoner will
have the following thinking:
 If the other prisoner confesses, I have to confess (since 3 years are less than 4 years).
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 If the other prisoner refuses to confess, I have to confess (since getting free is better
than 1 year in jail)
If the game is played one-shot, the best strategy for both players is to confess whatever
the opponent did; thus staying 3 years in jail. However, if the game is played repeatedly,
then the previous actions of each other become observable and they will know each other’s
decisions. Then, they may get a better result by not confessing together (1 year in jail).
Here lies the dilemma of the prisoners.
In VANET, the vehicles have to make decisions about cooperating with each other.
In making these decisions, nodes may behave selfishly, seeking exclusively for their own
interests. This makes the objectives of the different nodes conflicting (some nodes need
to be served and others consider that their interests lie in being uncooperative). Thus, the
application of game theory may be appropriate, as game theory analyzes situations in which
player objectives are in conflict. Moreover, the vehicles’ decision depends on the other
vehicles’ decisions. Therefore, the repeated games are the best to model such situation.
2.5 Related Work
We provide, in this section, an overview of the main contributions in the fields of clustering,
routing, and security in Mobile and Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks. We show then their
limitations and motivate the need for our contributions.
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2.5.1 Clustering in VANET
The communication in vehicular ad hoc networks entrains a high level of overhead, colli-
sion, and contention. In order to ensure efficient communications and mitigate the channel
collision, overhead, and contention; there should be wireless backbone architecture able
to elect some nodes to assume the network responsibilities. One solution is to gather the
nodes into clusters and elect for each cluster a specified node to serve as cluster-head. The
function of the cluster-head is to achieve both intra-cluster coordination, and inter-cluster
communication. The intra-cluster coordination involves the coordination among the nodes
within each cluster. In the inter-cluster communication, the cluster members charge the
cluster-head to communicate with the other cluster-heads on behalf on them. The clus-
tering imposes several challenges that should be taken into consideration such as: Which
node has to be elected as cluster-head? How the election procedure is done? What are the
requirements of the cluster-heads? How to increase and maintain the clusters lifetime?
Based on these challenges, several clustering algorithms for VANET have been pro-
posed trying to answer these questions. In the following, we present an overview on the
main contributions in this context.
APROVE [21] uses the Affinity Propagation algorithm to perform a clustering that
minimizes the distance and the mobility between cluster-heads and members. The affinity
metric is composed of responsibility and availability factors. Responsibility signals how
compatible is one node to become exemplar while availability signals the willingness of
the node to become exemplar.
Modified DMAC [23] was proposed on top of the original Basagni’s Distributed and
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Mobility-Adaptive Clustering algorithm. Its basic idea is to increase the stability and avoid
re-clustering of the group of vehicles moving in different directions using a freshness pa-
rameter. In this algorithm, each node has to know its moving direction, current position,
and velocity.
The authors in [24] propose a multi-hop clustering that uses the relative mobility be-
tween multi-hop away nodes. The beacon delay is used to calculate this metric. The cluster-
head is elected according to the smallest aggregate mobility value. This approach considers
also the problem of re-clustering by postponing it for some time.
In [15], the authors use complex metric composed of traffic conditions, connection
graph, and link quality. Before assigning a node to a cluster, a check on the node’s relia-
bility is done using the membership lifetime counter. This has the advantage of avoiding
needless re-clustering.
Presented clustering algorithms are proposed for different purposes such as clusters sta-
bility and overhead minimization. However, these algorithms ignore the Quality of Service
which is important for safety, emergency, and multimedia services in VANET [22]. The
Quality of Service relies primarily on connectivity, reliability, and end-to-end delay. Thus,
we propose a new clustering protocol called VANET QoS-OLSR that is able to maintain
the stability of the vehicular network while achieving a tradeoff between QoS requirements
and mobility constraints.
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2.5.2 Routing in VANET
After the clusters are formed, it is important to develop a routing algorithm able to achieve
the communications among clusters. Routing refers to the process of carrying a packet
from source to destination. In ad hoc networks, this process encounters several challenges.
These challenges range from the dynamic topology of the network, scalability, limited
physical security, to bandwidth and energy constraints. Based on these challenges, several
routing protocols are presented MANETs and VANETs.
Routing based on Ant Colony Optimization
Routing Algorithm using Ant Agents for MANETs (RAAM) [18] was proposed to reduce
the End-to-End delay. This can be done by creating multiple ant colonies that will travel
through different paths to select the optimal one. Nevertheless, the overhead is the short-
coming that encounters this algorithm.
Ant-Colony-Based Routing Algorithm (ARA) [14] gets several paths from source to
destination to transfer the packets. The drawback of ARA is that it cannot respond directly
to topology change because of its passive nature. Probabilistic Emergent Routing Algo-
rithm (PERA) [4] is, in contrary, an active method that periodically broadcasts ants so as to
avoid the local best solution. However, the overhead of the routing table and the periodic
broadcasts is a drawback that faces PERA.
The idea of AntHocNet [10] is to achieve a dynamic traffic loading balance for the
whole network in order to reveal the importance of the Quality-of-Service issue. Neverthe-
less, AntHocNet suffers from several limitations such as the long search time and the early
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convergence for large scales.
Routing based on Multi-point relay nodes
The classical OLSR [6] protocol has been modeled to cope with Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs). Its basic idea is to elect a cluster-head for each group of neighbor nodes and
divide hence the network into clusters. These heads then select a set of specialized nodes
called MultiPoints relay (MPRs). The function of the MPR nodes is to reduce the overhead
of flooding messages by minimizing the duplicate transmissions within the same zone.
QOLSR [2] was design on top of OLSR to consider the Quality of Service of the nodes
during the election of heads and the selection of MPRs. In fact, QOLSR focuses on choos-
ing optimal paths satisfying the QoS constraints. Though, the QOLSR is unable to deal
with Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks since it considers exclusively the nodes’ bandwidth ig-
noring thus some other important metrics such as mobility.
Then came QoS-OLSR [17], a cluster-based protocol that aims to prolong the network
lifetime. When electing heads and choosing MPRs, this protocol considers, in addition to
the bandwidth, some metrics that may affect the network lifetime such as the residual en-
ergy. Nevertheless, the QoS-OLSR has many limitations that make it inadequate to achieve
the VANET requirements since it ignores the mobility of nodes while computing the QoS.
In summary, vehicular ad hoc networks have some characteristics that make them
unique among other types of networks. Practically, VANET is characterized by the very
high mobility of its nodes and the frequent disconnections. Numerous routing protocols
have been proposed for MANETs, and some of them could be applied to VANETs. Never-
theless, simulation results proved that they suffer from bad performances due to the specific
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features of VANET such as: rapid vehicles movement, dynamic packets exchange and high
speed of nodes. Thus, finding and maintaining routes is a very challenging task in VANETs.
In this work, we propose a routing algorithm based on Ant Colony Optimization that is able
to select the best path in terms of QoS and mobility; thus maintaining the stability without
sacrificing the performance.
2.5.3 Security issues in VANET
One additional question should be added to the clustering and routing challenges, which
is: are the vehicles willing really to contribute in the clustering and routing processes by
serving as cluster-heads and MPRs? In fact, proposing clustering and routing protocols
for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks is not enough. Practically, there should be a clear vision
of how to ensure the proper implementation of these protocols. However, some vehicles
may have objectives that contradict the proper functioning of these protocols. These selfish
or misbehaving nodes seek to achieve their objectives neglecting the welfare of the whole
network. Several contributions are proposed in the literature to deal with these nodes.
These contributions can be categorized into: incentive-based approaches, and detection-
based approaches.
Incentive-based Approaches
The receipt counting method [26] was proposed by Lee et al. to control the commercial ad
dissemination in VANETs. According to this method, the source of the packet undertakes
a fixed value for each receipt. The shortcoming of this method is that the source does not
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know the number of network nodes in advance and is not able hence to predict the total
amount of payments. This entrains an overspending problem for the source nodes.
Douceur et al. [25] resorted to the use of a lottery tree mechanism called lottree. This
method is based on selecting periodically one node in the network to be the receiver of the
payment. This selection is achieved in a way that guarantees to encourage high participa-
tion and to stimulate new participants. However, the lottery schemes suffer from the fact
that only one winner will be selected to obtain the whole payment. This would discourage
conservative nodes from participating regarding their poor chances to win.
FRAME [27] is made up of two phases: Weighted rewarding component and Sweep-
stake component. The weighted rewarding component assigns weighted rewards for each
vehicle according to its contribution. The sweepstake component grants the winner partic-
ipating vehicle a fixed payment amount. Nonetheless, this strategy encourages the sender
nodes to avoid the intermediate nodes and get connected straight to the destination so as to
gain more contribution weight.
Zhong et al. advanced an incentive scheme called SPRITE [28] that exploits the VCG
mechanism [33] to choose the best available single path. It utilizes the game theory to es-
tablish the charges and credits, and encourages then each node to state its actions truthfully.
Nevertheless, this method necessitates a Credit Clearance System.
In gross, the basic idea of incentive-based schemes is that nodes pay virtual money to
get served and get paid to serve. Nonetheless, the lack of scalability, centralization, and the
need for a tamper-proof hardware are the limitations that may encounter these schemes.
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Detection-based Approaches
Tit-for-Tat [30] associates the incentive mechanisms with the reputation concept so that co-
operating with more reputable nodes enable the nodes from increasing their own reputation
and benefiting hence from a larger set of services. However, this strategy suffers from three
main problems. First, the decision of cooperation is restricted to the local relation of each
pair of nodes. Second, it ignores the cases of high mobility and collisions that may hinder
the monitoring process. Finally, this method ends up with a deadlock where no node is
willing to cooperate with any other node.
Marti et al. [31] integrated the watchdog and pathrater concepts into the Dynamic
Source Routing (DSR) [34] protocol. Their approach suggests preventing the detected
misbehaving from forwarding packets instead of punishing them. However, according to
this scheme the misbehaving nodes are remunerated vis-à-vis their behavior as their packets
continue to be transmitted by others while they do not have to transmit and spend resources.
CONFIDANT [29] is based on sending an alarm to the network nodes whenever a
misbehaving node is detected in the purpose of isolating these nodes from the network.
Yet, the credibility of the received alarms is not guaranteed.
Overall, in the detection-based schemes, nodes monitor, detect, and then announce an-
other node to be misbehaving. This announcement is then broadcasted all over the network,
leading to discard the misbehaving node from being used in all future routes. However, de-
spite the advantage of these kinds of approaches that they need no specialized hardware,
they have several disadvantages that may limit their efficiency such as: ambiguous colli-
sion, limited transmission power, false alarms, and non-cooperative cooperation/defection
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decision.
2.6 Conclusion
We explained in this chapter the Ant Colony Optimization algorithm, Dempster-Shafer the-
ory, and repeated game theory that constitute the core of the thesis. We presented then the
related works in the fields of clustering, routing, and security in both mobile and vehicular
ad hoc networks. We showed the clustering algorithms are unilateral since they focus ei-
ther on the QoS requirements or on the mobility metrics and are insufficient hence to form
stable and robust clusters in VANET. Moreover, the existing routing algorithms are unable
to select and maintain the optimal paths in terms of QoS, stability, delay, and overhead.
Concerning the misbehaving vehicles, the existing approaches have several limitations that
make them inefficient to deal with the selfish nodes such as: lack for scalability and cen-
tralization, ambiguous collisions, and false alarms.
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Chapter 3
QoS-based Clustering Model for
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
3.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the problem of clustering in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs).
Several clustering algorithms have been proposed for VANET and MANET. However, the
mobility-based algorithms ignore the Quality of Service requirements that are important for
safety, emergency, and multimedia services of VANET, while the QoS-based algorithms
ignore the high speed mobility constraints since they are dedicated for Mobile Ad hoc Net-
works (MANETs). Our solution is a new QoS-based clustering algorithm that considers
a tradeoff between QoS requirements and high speed mobility constraints. The goal is to
form stable clusters and maintain the stability during communications and link failures,
while satisfying the Quality of Service requirements. When achieving this goal, the fol-
lowing problems arise:
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 The high mobility of vehicles
 The link failures after clusters formation.
These problems are solved by: (1) considering the high mobility metrics while computing
the QoS, (2) using Ant Colony Optimization for MPRs selection, and (3) using MPR re-
covery algorithm able to select alternatives and keep the network connected in case of link
failures. Mathematical analysis and simulation results are used to evaluate the performance
of the proposed protocol and prove its efficiency.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the proposed
protocol and describes its three components. Section 3.3 gives an illustrative example to
show how the proposed protocol works. Section 3.4 analyzes the performance of the pro-
posed protocol mathematically. Section 3.5 describes the scenario used during simulations.
Section 3.6 presents empirical results. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 VANET QoS-OLSR Protocol
In this section, we describe the VANET QoS-OLSR protocol proposed to maintain the sta-
bility of the vehicular network. We explain its two components: the QoS-based Clustering,
and the MPR recovery. Thereafter, we give an illustrative example explaining how our pro-
tocol works. The protocol can be summarized as follows. First, the cluster-head election
algorithm elects a set of optimal cluster-heads. Next, the elected cluster-heads select a set
of optimal MPR nodes responsible for transmitting the packets and connecting the clusters.
Finally, the MPR recovery algorithm deals with link failures by selecting alternative MPRs.
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Table 2: Notations
Symbol Significance
N :, Set of nodes in the network.
N2(i) :, 2-hop away nodes from node i.
k :, Source cluster-head.
d :, Destination cluster-head.
m(k) :, Number of 1-hop away nodes from k.
QoS(i) :, Quality of Service value of node or path i.
D(i) :, End-to-End delay of path i.
Pheromone(i) :, Pheromone value of path i.
P :, Set of all paths leading to d.
Prob(i) :, Probability of pheromone for path i.
MPRSet(i) :, Set of MPRs selected by head i.
s :, Nodes Visited Stack.
s(i) :, ith element of s.
3.2.1 QoS-based Clustering
A QoS-based clustering model for VANET is proposed. The clustering model relies on two
algorithms, the cluster-head election algorithm and the MPRs selection algorithm. In the
following, we present the notations and the details of these algorithms.
The Quality of Service Metric Models
To enhance the stability and the quality of service, we propose several Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS) models. In the case of MANET, each node chooses its cluster-head according
to several parameters such as proportional bandwidth, and residual energy. In our case,
the Vehicular Ad hoc Network topology imposes new parameters to adopt in addition to
bandwidth and connectivity namely the vehicle’s mobility represented by residual distance
and velocity. Therefore, we suggest five different QoS models according to different com-
binations of the QoS metrics. The bandwidth is considered to ensure the reliability, the
connectivity is considered to increase the coverage of cluster-heads and MPRs, while the
velocity and distance parameters are considered to maintain the stability of the network.
The models are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3: Quality of Service Metrics
Notations and Quality of Service Metric Function
Let i be a node in the network. Let’s define:
QoS(i) = Quality of Service Metric of node i
BW(i) = Available bandwidth of i
N(i) = Neighbors of i
VelRatio(i) = Ratio of velocity for i
DistRatio(i): Ratio of remaining distance for i
Bandwidth Model
QoS(i) = BW(i);
Proportional Bandwidth
QoS(i) = BW (i)
N(i)
;
Proportional Bandwidth & Velocity Model (Prop. B-V)
QoS(i) = BW (i)
N(i)
 V elRatio(i);
Proportional Bandwidth & Proportional Distance Model (Prop. B-DV)
QoS(i) = BW (i)
N(i)
 DistRatio(i)
V elRatio(i)
;
Bandwidth-Connectivity & Proportional Distance Model (BCDV)
QoS(i) = BW (i)N(i) DistRatio(i)
V elRatio(i)
;
The VelRatio of a node is the velocity ratio for this node. It is calculated according to
Algorithm 1.
For example, if a car travels at 60 mph (96.56 km/h) on a trip and at 100 mph (160.93
km/h) on return trip. Then, the average total speed of the entire trip would be, Total average
speed = 2*60*100/(100+60) = 75 mph (120.7 km/h). The velocity(i) can be any number
between 80 and 120, and the VelRatio for nodes respecting the average speed will be  1,
which increases the QoS value for these nodes (if we divide by velocity). In contrary, the
nodes violating the speed limits will have a VelRatio > 1 and then a reduced QoS value.
Similarly, the DistRatio of a node is the ratio of residual distance towards the destination.
The calculation procedure of this ratio is explained in Algorithm 10. The distance param-
eter in the deployed systems can be obtained with help of the Global Positioning System
(GPS)
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Algorithm 1 Velocity Ratio Calculation
1: Initialization:
2: D = distance traveled by the car in each direction
3: t1 = time spent on onward trip
4: t2 = time spent on return trip
5: Total distance traveled by the car = D+D= 2D
6: Total time = t1+t2
7: AvgSpeed:= Total distance/Total time = 2D/(t1+t2).
8: procedure VELOCITYRATIOCALCULATION
9: for each node i 2 N do
10: Velocity(i):= random integer between Minimum and Maximum speed
11: VelRatio(i):=Velocity(i)/AvgSpeed
12: end for
13: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Distance Ratio Calculation
1: Initialization:
2: MaximumDistance:= the distance between source and destination;
3: procedure DISTANCERATIOCALCULATION
4: for each node i 2 N do
5: CurrentPosition(i): the current position of i
6: ResidualDistance(i):=MaximumDistance-CurrentPosition(i)
7: DistanceRatio(i):=ResidualDistance(i)/MaximumDistance
8: end for
9: end procedure
Efficiency of Adding Mobility Metrics
Several contributions addressed the problem of QoS in Mobile Ad hoc Networks. The
main proposed metrics in these contributions [1, 3, 5] were the connection duration, packet
delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, and jitter. However, these schemes do not take into con-
sideration the vehicular topology. Therefore, we suggest adding two new metrics dedicated
to the VANET topology namely the velocity and the residual distance. Considering the
residual distance has two objectives: (1) group the vehicles into clusters with convergent
residual distance, and (2) ensure to elect heads and MPRs with considerable distance to tra-
verse. Similarly, adding the velocity parameter has two objectives: (1) group the vehicles
into clusters with convergent velocity scale, and (2) ensure to elect heads and MPRs with
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reasonable velocity. The first objective contributes in prolonging the lifetime of the clus-
ters, while the second reduces the link failures. Therefore, adding these VANET-dedicated
parameters to the other important network-dedicated factors such as bandwidth and con-
nectivity ensures to have a stable and reliable Vehicular Ad Hoc Network.
The Cluster-Head Election Algorithm
In the following, we model a cluster-head election algorithm that allows to electing a set
of optimal cluster-heads and dividing the network into clusters. The algorithm works as
follows. The nodes broadcastHELLOmessages containing their QoS values two-hop away.
Then, each node votes for its neighbor having the local maximal Quality of Service metric
value. A node can as well vote for itself, if it has the maximal local QoS value. The nodes
use their special HELLO messages, called Election messages, to locally broadcast their
votes. Once the election procedure is done, the elected node acknowledges to serve as a
cluster-head by sending an Ackmessage containing its public key. This message is sent also
2-hop away. Thereafter, the elected cluster heads act as MPR nodes for their electors. They
should hence broadcast TC messages containing their electors. This algorithm is described
in Algorithm 3.
Note that some modifications need to take place to the classical HELLO message. The
first one is adding a flag, the H flag, to signal that a node has been designated as a cluster-
head. The second is to add a new neighbor type in the link code. This H _NEIGH flag
denotes that a neighbor has been elected as a cluster head. The Election messages are used
by the nodes to indicate the neighbors for which node this neighbor has voted for.
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Algorithm 3 Cluster Head Election Algorithm
1: procedure CLUSTERHEADELECTION
2: for each node i 2 N do
3: broadcast HELLO message containing QoS(i) 2-hop away
4: Let k 2 N2(i) [ fig be s.t.
5: QoS(k) := maxfQoS(j)jj 2 N2(i) [ figg
6: vote for k through the Election messages
7: MPRSet(i) := fkg
8: end for
9: for each elected head k 2 N do
10: broadcast an Ack message 2-hop away
11: end for
12: end procedure
Ant Colony Optimization Basic Notations
Ant Colony Optimization [12] imitates the real behavior of ants seeking for food. Ants
search in the environment of anthill; when the food is found, they turn back to their home
depositing a chemical substance called pheromone. Thus, the other ants that can smell this
substance will follow the same path which will successively get passed. The shortest path
will remain consequently followed among various paths due to the continuous reinforce-
ment by pheromone trails.
In this work, we exploit this swarm intelligence algorithm to optimize the communi-
cations among clusters in a cluster-based QoS-OLSR protocol. To do so, some ant agents
called ANT-HELLO are responsible for gathering information about all the paths and come
up with an optimal choice in this context. The goodness of a path is estimated using the
pheromone value. All pheromone values are set initially to 100 and are updated periodi-
cally according to the ants’ observations. The nodes preserve probabilistic routing tables
containing the probability of choosing a neighbor as the next hop for any destination. These
tables are updated periodically by the ant agents based on the quality of paths. The quality
of paths is expressed, in turn, in terms of Quality of Service and End-to-End delay.
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An important element of the ACO, which is used to enhance the future solutions, is
the pheromone evaporation. It is done according to the following equation [11]: i =
 i+(1 ) qi where  is a smoothing factor between 0 and 1, and qi is the measured
route quality. The efficiency of the evaporation process can be summarized as follows. The
pheromone trails start to evaporate as the time evolves. Thus, the goodness probability
represented by the pheromone value will begin to disappear piecemeal unless they are rein-
forced by more ants. The optimal path will hence get marched by more ants than the other
paths. This would increase its pheromone density. Thus, the evaporation phenomenon is
important to avoid the convergence to local optimal solutions.
The MPR Nodes Selection Algorithm
Once elected, the cluster-heads are charged to select a set of optimal MPR nodes. This set
of nodes is responsible for interconnecting the clusters and forming a connected network.
The MPRs selection algorithm assumes that a flag indicating node’s QoS value is added to
the ANT-HELLO message.
The MPRs selection algorithm works as follows. Consider a case where two cluster-
heads want to establish a communication between each other by selecting a set of MPR
nodes. Initially, the source cluster-head sets the ANT-HELLOmessages type to 0 indicating
that these messages will be forwarded to the destination cluster-head. It then sends “m”
messages (m is the number of 1-hop away neighbors leading to the destination head) to its
2-hop away nodes. Each intermediate node receiving this ant message calculates its QoS
metrics value and inserts it in the appropriate field of the message. Meanwhile, the ants
save each visited node in the “Nodes Visited Stack” field of the ANT-HELLO message to
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Algorithm 4MPR Selection Algorithm
1: Initialization:
2: MPRSet(k) :=MPRSet(d) := ;
Part I - Go Phase
3: procedure GOPHASE
4: for each source k do
5: Set “Type” flag in ANT-HELLO message to 0 (forward)
6: Broadcastm(k) ANT-HELLO messages two-hop away
7: for each intermediate node i do
8: Compute QoS(i)
9: Insert QoS(i) into ANT-HELLO
10: end for
11: end for
12: end procedure
Part II - Back Phase
13: procedure BACKPHASE
14: for each destination d do
15: Set “Type” flag in ANT-HELLO message to 1 (backward)
16: for each path i do
17: Calculate D(i)
18: Compute QoS(i) := QoS(x)jx 2 i and QoS(x) := minfQoS(u)ju 2 ig
19: Compute Pheromone(i) := QoS(i) D(i)
20: Compute Prob(i) := Pheromone(i)=
PP
j21 Pheromone(j)
21: end for
22: MPRSet(d) := fxjx 2 jjprob(j) := maxfprob(u)ju 2 Pgg
23: Send back the ANT-HELLO messages 2-hop away
24: end for
25: end procedure
Part III - Final Phase
26: procedure FINALPHASE
27: for each source k do
28: MPRSet(k) := fxjx 2 jjprob(j) := maxfprob(u)ju 2 Pgg
29: end for
30: end procedure
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be used later for tacking back the route. The ANT-HELLOmessages keep being propagated
2-hop away until reaching the intended cluster-head.
Once reached, this cluster-head sets the type of ANT-HELLO messages to 1 indicating
that these messages will be backwarded to the source. It then extracts the QoS values of
the intermediate nodes and sums up the QoS values for the nodes forming a single path. It
calculates also the End-to-End delay for each path using the number of hops presented in
the “Nodes Visited Stack”. It updates hence the “route time” field accordingly. In order
to compute the pheromone value for each path, it subtracts the End-to-End delay from the
sum of QoS values for each single path. Now, this cluster-head node has the pheromone
values of all the paths leading to it. Hence, it updates the “pheromone value” field with
these values. Similarly, the pheromone value of each single node is calculated. This value
is equal to the node’s QoS value. Thereafter, this cluster-head calculates the probability
of pheromone for each path. Afterwards, it selects the nodes belonging to the path having
the higher probability of pheromone and located within the scope of its cluster as MPRs.
Next, it sends back the ANT-HELLOmessages two-hop away until reaching the source head
through the chosen optimal path. This latter cluster-head, in turn, receives the messages and
selects the nodes belonging to the optimal path and locating within its cluster as MPRs.
Now, these two cluster-heads can communicate with each other through the selected MPR
nodes. Note that the 3-hop away cluster heads may be reached through the 2-hop away
nodes. The MPRs selection algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4.
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3.2.2 MPR Recovery Algorithm
Link failures represent a big challenge to the stability of the vehicular network. Fig. 2
illustrates a link failure example where node 8 serving as MPR between Cluster 1 and
Cluster 2 decides to leave its current cluster and join Cluster 3. Thus, the link between
Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 is broken and they cannot communicate with each other until a
new set of MPRs is selected. Link failures occur due to several reasons such as: mobility,
interference, and congestion.
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Figure 2: Link failure example
 Mobility: VANET is characterized by a high mobility resulting from the high speed
of vehicles. This leads to recurrent disconnections and link failures.
 Congestion: The heavily loaded networks may produce congestions in Vehicular Ad
hoc Networks, which would in turn cause link failures.
 Interference: The interference occurs mostly due to packets collisions. This collision
may be intentional or unintentional. In both cases, the interference would result in
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link failure.
In order to maintain the stability of the network and reduce the overhead caused by the
repeated elections, we propose a MPR recovery algorithm capable to deal with link failures
and keep the network connected. Our algorithm does not rely on lower level service to
detect link failures. Instead, link failures are detected when an expected TC message from
a certain MPR is not received. The algorithm works as follows. Once the cluster-head
receives the ANT-HELLO message, it first sorts the “Nodes Visited Stack” in decreasing
order according to the pheromone values. Then, if a cluster-head misses a TC message
from a certain MPR, it first deactivates this link by removing this node from the stack.
This means that a link failure by this MPR has occurred. It selects then the first element
of the stack as MPR. This node leads to the same destination since it was visited by the
ANT-HELLO message and has the higher pheromone value as a result of the sorting. This
process is repeated until the stack becomes empty. When the stack becomes empty, the
cluster-head launches the MPRs selection algorithm again in order to select a new set of
MPRs. Thus, we are reducing the overhead by providing a simple method capable to
deal with link failures and keep the network connected without the need for repeated re-
elections. The MPR recovery algorithm is presented in Algorithm 5.
3.3 Illustrative Example
To illustrate how VANET QoS-OLSR works, we present a concrete example. Fig. 3 shows
a network with fourteen nodes and six possible paths. Table 5 gives the pheromone value
and the relevant probability of each path using the MPRs selection algorithm (refer to
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Algorithm 5MPR Recovery Algorithm
1: procedure MPRRECOVERY
2: for each cluster-head k do
3: Sort the “Nodes Visited Stack” s
4: if(TCmsgNotRcvdT ime(n) > TimeAllowedForTC()) then
5: s := s  fng
6: MPRset(k) := i=i 2 s(1)
7: if(isEmpty(s)) then
8: MPRSelectionAlgorithm()
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: end procedure
Table 4: QoS metrics values of nodes using the BCDV model
Nodes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
QoS value 575:8 197 503:2 379:4 316:7 338:7 308:1
Pheromone 575:8 197 503:2 379:4 316:7 338:7 308:1
Nodes 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
QoS value 400 234:01 159:54 389:5 746:5 797:8 546:76
Pheromone 400 234:01 159:54 389:5 746:5 797:8 546:76
Algorithm 4), while Table 13 shows the QoS metrics value and the pheromone value for
each node according to the BCDV model (Table 3). The pheromone value for a single node
corresponds to the QoS value of this node. The QoS value of a certain path is determined
by finding the minimal QoS for the path. It is computed as follows. Let’s take the path
p1: QoS(p1) = min(QoS(node 6); QoS(node 7)) = min(338:7; 308:1) = 308:1. After
receiving theHELLOmessages from its neighbors, a node votes for the neighbor having the
local maximal Quality of Service metric value to be the cluster-head. This is done according
to the BCDV QoS function (Table 3). Using the Cluster Head Election algorithm, nodes
12 and 13 are elected (Algorithm 3) as cluster-heads. From now on we call node 12 as
CH-1 and node 13 as CH-2. To connect CH-1 with CH-2 which is 3-hop far away, CH-
1 has 6 possible paths: 6-7-CH-2, 6-8-CH-2, 6-9-CH-2, 1-7-CH-2, 1-8-CH-2, 1-9-CH-2.
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Table 5: The pheromone probability values using MPRs selection algorithm
Path p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 Sum
Nodes 6  7 6  8 6  9 1  7 1  8 1  9  
End-to-End delay (seconds) 125 256 233 479 107 108  
Pheromone 521:8 482:7 339:71 404:9 868:8 701:81 3329:72
Probability 0:16 0:14 0:11 0:12 0:26 0:21 1
5
4
3
2
6
10
9
7
11ant 1
ant 2
ant1-2
ant1-1
ant2-1
ant2-3
ant2-2
14
1 8
12
MPR Node Cluster-head Node Normal Node
13
Figure 3: Vehicular Ad Hoc Network example
The source head CH-1 first sends 2 (according to the number of its 1-hop away neighbors)
forward ANT-HELLOmessages to all the 2-hops away nodes (nodes 7, 8 and 9). During the
Go phase (Algorithm 4-Part I), each node receiving this message calculates its QoS metrics,
encrypts this value using the destination head CH-2 public key, and inserts the encrypted
value in the message. Upon receiving the messages (Algorithm 4-Part II), CH-2 decrypts
the QoS values and subtracts them from the path route time to calculate the pheromone
values. In our case, the path 1  8 gives the higher pheromone probability (Table 5). Then,
CH-2 chooses the node 8 as MPR, encrypts the QoS values using CH-1 public key and
sends back the ANT-HELLO messages through the 1   8 path. The source head (CH-1),
in its turn, upon receiving the messages (Algorithm 4-Part III), selects node 1 as MPR.
Now, the CH-1 and CH-2 can communicate through the path 1   8. The selected cluster-
heads CH-1 and CH-2 then sort the “Nodes Visited Stack” of the ANT-HELLO message in
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decreasing order according to the pheromone values. Suppose now that node 1 serving as
MPR fell out of the transmission range of the cluster-head CH-1 and causes hence a link
failure. Using the MPR recovery algorithm (Algorithm 5), CH-1 deactivates the link of
node 1 by removing it from the stack. Then, it selects the first element of the stack as MPR
(node 6 in our case) since this node has the higher pheromone value after node 1 and leads
to the same destination CH-2 given that the ANT-HELLO message has visited it. The path
6  8 is then used to connect the two clusters. CH-1 can still handle the link failures in the
same way until the stack becomes empty. If it is the case, then it has to launch the MPRs
selection algorithm again.
3.4 Performance Analysis
Since the simulation results have become recently not sufficient for evaluating a proposed
scheme, we analyze in this section the performance of several aspects related to our ap-
proach such as: overhead of the MPR selection algorithm, percentage of MPRs, network
stability, end-to-end delay, and packet delivery ratio.
3.4.1 Computation Overhead
Each normal node i encrypts its Quality of Service (QoS) value. Later on, only the cluster-
heads decrypt, using their private keys, the encrypted values in order to find the optimal
path and select then the appropriate MPRs. They also encrypt back the QoS values us-
ing each other public keys. Hence, each normal node encrypts one message and does not
decrypt anything. On the other hand, the cluster-head encrypts TNgi and decrypts TNgi
41
messages where TNgi is the number of 2-hop away nodes leading to the desired destina-
tion. Note that each normal node must find the highest QoS value amongst its neighbors
to elect it as cluster-head which requires O(log(Ngi)) where Ngi is the number of neigh-
boring nodes. Therefore, each node approximately performs O(1) encryption, 0 decryp-
tion, and O(log(Ngi)) to calculate the highest QoS value. The cluster-head node performs
TNgi encryptions and TNgi decryptions. Thus, the computation overhead for each node
is O(TNgi) + O(1) + O(log(Ngi))  O(TNgi). Note that this overhead level is small in
comparison with other algorithms since it is bounded by the number of 2-hop away nodes
instead of being bounded by the number of all neighboring nodes. In the most of protocols
that use ant colony optimization for the routing such as SACOM [19], AntHocNet [10],
ARA [14], and PERA [4], the sender node has to broadcast the ant packet many hops away
which causes a wide overhead over the network.
3.4.2 Communication Overhead
The cluster-head nodes broadcast three messages to at maximum 2-hop away nodes (HELLO,
ANT-HELLO, and Ack). The normal nodes broadcast two messages (HELLO, and Election)
also two-hop away. Later on, the MPR nodes broadcast TC messages over the network to
indicate neighbors information. Hence, the total communication overhead of our algorithm
is Ngi + 3TNgi + 2TNgi = Ngi + 5TNgi, where Ngi is the total number of nodes and
TNgi is the number of 2-hop away nodes. This level of overhead is acceptable compared
with other Ant Colony Optimization based approaches where the source node has to broad-
cast the messages to many hops away. In this model, the cluster-head broadcasts three
42
messages 2-hop away only.
3.4.3 Percentage of MPRs
The number of needed MPRs is inversely proportional to the connectivity of the selected
set of MPRs. This means, as the connectivity increases, the number of selected MPRs will
decrease and vice versa. Consider a cluster of N nodes. Suppose that the cluster-head of
this cluster selects a MPR with connectivityN 8. Hence, there will beN (N 8) nodes
not covered by this MPR and need another set of MPRs to may communicate with other
clusters. In contrary, if the connectivity of the MPR was N   3 there will be N   (N   3)
nodes not covered by this MPR and need another set of MPRs to may communicate with
other clusters. Knowing the fact thatN (N 3) < N (N 8), it is clear that the number
of uncovered nodes by the MPRs having higher connectivity level is less than that by the
MPRs having less connectivity. Thus, as the connectivity of the selected MPRs increases,
the need for selecting new MPR nodes will decrease. This shows that our proposed model,
which assumes that the connectivity factor should be multiplied by the QoS function, is
able to reduce the percentage of MPRs and decrease hence the jamming over the network
caused by the large number of sent TC messages.
3.4.4 Network Stability
Consider a network composed of two clusters. The first cluster has to select a MPR in order
to communicate with the other cluster. We have two axioms:
 Axiom1: the time for a MPR existing in the first cluster to reach the other cluster is
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t = d=v, where v is the velocity at which the MPR is driving and d is the distance
separating the MPR from the second cluster.
 Axiom2: d = D, where D is a constant.
Consider the two following cases.
 Case1: the first cluster-head elects a MPR with velocity V: So, the time for this MPR
to get the other cluster is t = D=V .
 Case2: the first cluster-head elects a MPR with velocity 2V . Thus, the time to get
the other cluster will be t = D=2V .
Knowing the fact that D=2V < D=V , it is obvious that the MPR in the second case will
move to the other cluster earlier and break down hence the communication between the
two clusters. Therefore, the less the velocity, the more the stability and dividing the QoS
function by the velocity will prolong the clusters’ lifetime. Let’s take a similar example
for the residual distance. A cluster-head has to select a MPR in order to communicate with
other clusters. We have the following axiom:
 Axiom1: the MPR is driving with velocity V where V is a constant.
Consider the two following cases.
 Case1: the first cluster elects a MPR having a residual distance of D.
 Case2: the first cluster elects a MPR having a residual distance of 2D.
In the first case, the time separating the MPR from reaching the other cluster is t = D=V .
In the second case, the time will be t = 2D=V . Since 2D=V > D=V , the MPR in the
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second case will be farther from reaching the other cluster, which is desirable. Thus, the
link between the two clusters will last for more time. Consequently, the more the residual
distance, the more the stability; Overall, we can notice that multiplying the QoS metrics
function by the residual distance and dividing it by the velocity parameter increase the
stability of the network.
3.4.5 End-to-End Delay
Consider a network with two clusters. The first cluster has to elect a MPR to be able
to communicate with the other cluster. It has the choice between Node1 and Node2 be-
longing respectively to Path1 and Path2. Initially, the pheromone values of the paths are
pheromone(Path1)=QoS(Path1)= and pheromone(Path2)= QoS(Path2)=, for example.
According to the MPR selection algorithm (Algorithm 4), the cluster-head has to send
some ants to detect the local optimal path in terms of pheromone value. Assume ants
reported that the route times of Path1 and Path2 are t and t + 10 seconds respectively.
According to Algorithm 4, the pheromone values are calculated in the following way:
pheromone(Path1)=QoS(Path1)-time(Path1)=   t and pheromone(Path2)=QoS(Path2)-
time(Path2)=  (t+10). Node1, which belongs to the path having the highest pheromone,
will be then selected to serve as MPR. It’s obvious that Node1 has to traverse less number
of hops to reach the second cluster since t < t + 10. According to Ant Colony Algorithm,
this node will still be selected as MPR until another local optimal choice arises due to the
fact that it will get marched frequently by ants. Thus, the end-to-end delay represented by
the number of hops is minimized in our protocol.
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3.4.6 Packet Delivery Ratio
The Packet Deliver Ratio is defined as the total number of packets received by the desti-
nation over the total number of packets sent by the source within a period of simulation:
PDR = Total number of received packets
Total number of sent packets
. Thus, as the number of received packets increases,
this ratio will also increase. The number of received packets relies on several factors includ-
ing: connectivity, percentage of stability, and End-to-End delay. The connectivity and the
percentage of stability ensure that the packets are transmitted along a continuous connected
path without packet losses. This increases the probability of the packets to be received. The
End-to-End delay is also important in this context. The increase of this factor increases the
likelihood of packet losses and timeouts which reduces the total number of received packets
and reduces hence the packet delivery ratio and vice versa. The above paragraphs show that
VANET QoS-OLSR is able to increase the connectivity and the percentage of stability and
decrease the End-to-End delay. As a result, VANET QoS-OLSR is able as well to increase
the packet deliver ratio.
3.5 Simulation Model and Parameters
In order to compare the different models, we resorted to the use of Matlab [46] network
simulator with the VanetMobiSim [13] traffic simulator. VanetMobiSim is an XML-based
traffic simulator that allows the user to define the vehicular network features such as num-
ber of nodes, topography, velocity, duration, and time steps. VanetMobiSim supports both
micro-mobility and macro-mobility features. Macro mobility model cares of the macro-
scopic aspects that affect the vehicular traffic such as road topology, intersections, number
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of lanes, traffic light constraints, and speed limits. Micro mobility is concerned more by
the driving behavior such as acceleration, deceleration, and behavior in presence of traffic
signs [13]. A simulation area of 3000  1000m is used to simulate a set of nodes varying
from 30 to 100. The screenshot of this area is presented in Fig. 4. The multi-lane highway
topology is used to simulate the traffic. The minimum allowed speed on this highway was
set to 60 km/h while the maximum speed was 120 km/h. Each simulation round lasted 500
seconds after 30 seconds for the initialization. After the simulation has been completed,
VanetMobisim generates a file containing some important features such as time, velocity,
and position. We parse hence this file to use these parameters to simulate the vehicular net-
work using Matlab. The transmission ranges used for the simulations vary from 150 to 300.
To provide more accurate simulations, we took a confidence level of 95%. Then, we run
independent simulations for each factor being evaluated (e.g, clusters stability, percentage
of MPRs, packet delivery ratio...) and we calculate the mean average of this factor as well
as the standard deviation. Using these calculated parameters, we calculate the lower and
upper bounds for the confidence interval and we check whether the estimated mean average
falls within this interval. If so, this means that we would expect 95% of the interval esti-
mates to include the parameter average. Then, we stop the simulation runs. Otherwise, we
keep increasing the simulation runs until attaining a 95% confidence interval (e.g., obtain-
ing a mean average within the confidence interval). Experiment results show that running
100 independent simulation runs is able to provide results within the confidence interval.
The number of selfish nodes used to simulate the aggregation models vary from 10%
to 50% of the total nodes. Within this interval, the impact of the selfish nodes will be
catastrophic on the network as depicted in the section 4.1. For 0% of selfish nodes, there
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Table 6: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 30; 40; 50; 60; 70; 80; and 100
Percentage of selfish nodes 0%; 20%; 30%; 40%, and 50%
Transmission range 300 m
Topology Multi-lane highway
Packet Size 1 kb
Idle Time Random value in [0::1]
Link Bandwidth 2Mbps
Available Bandwidth Idle T ime Link Bandwidth
Initial Reputation 100
Hello messages 18 messages are sent per minute
Minimum Speed 60 km/h
Maximum Speed 120 km/h
Number of simulation runs 100 (95% confidence interval shown)
Figure 4: Screenshot of the vehicular movement simulation using VanetMobisim
is no need for detection. Similarly, above 50% the misbehaving nodes form the majority
and their negative impact begin to diminish gradually since they can form new clusters
and resume the networking functions again. The simulation parameters are summarized in
Table 6.
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3.6 Simulation Results
This section is divided into two parts. The first part presents the results after comparing
our five proposed models (available in Table 3) with each others, while the second part is
devoted to compare the preferred model among them with the QoS-OLSR and the classical
QOLSR approaches. The factors to evaluate during the simulations are the: percentage of
MPRs, percentage of stability, End-to-End, packet delivery ratio, and bandwidth average
difference.
3.6.1 Comparison Between Our Proposed Models
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Figure 6: Percentage of stability
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Figure 8: Packet Delivery Ratio
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In this part, we present a comparison between our proposed models presented in Table
3 in order to find the best model that will be compared with the other approaches. In terms
of MPRs, Fig. 5 reveals that the Bandwidth-Connectivity& Proportional Distance (BCDV)
model gives the least percentage. This result is obtained by multiplying the connectivity by
the other metrics instead of dividing it by the QoS metrics in the most of other functions
(refer to Table 3). Concerning the clusters stability, which depends mainly on the distance
and velocity factors, Fig. 6 shows that BCDV gives an improved percentage of stability
compared to the other models. The average number of hops between the source and des-
tination is also reduced with this model according to Fig. 7 which reduces the end-to-end
delay. Similarly, the packet delivery ratio is increased using BCDV model as depicted in
Fig. 8.
Table 7: Bandwidth Average Difference between our models
Models
Transmission Ranges
150 200 300
Bandwidth 0% 0% 0%
Proportional bandwidth 6:75% 3:85% 3:15%
Proportional B-V 7:57% 4:21% 4:55%
Proportional B-DV 6:63% 5:11% 3:76%
BCDV 7:08% 4:3% 3:92%
Moving to the percentage of bandwidth average difference, this factor can be defined
as the bandwidth difference between the path having the maximal bandwidth value and the
path currently selected. Table 7 reveals that the model adopting the bandwidth alone should
annul this percentage and give hence the optimal solution in this context. For the remaining
models, the BCDV and Proportional Bandwidth models compete to give the least average
difference.
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In gross, the BCDV model should be selected to be compared with other approaches.
From now on, we call the BCDV model as VANET-QoS-OLSR when comparing it with
the other approaches.
3.6.2 Comparison With Other Approaches
In this part, we present a detailed comparison between our proposed protocol, the cluster-
based QoS-OLSR, and the classical without clustering QOLSR. The latter approach adopts
only the bandwidth factor for calculating the QoS function, while the QoS-OLSR uses
the proportional bandwidth combined with the residual energy of each node to build the
Quality of Service function. In contrary to QOLSR, VANET QoS-OLSR and QoS-OLSR
adopt the clustering concept so that each set of nodes elects their cluster-head which is,
in turn, responsible for electing the appropriate set of MPRs entitled to communicate with
other clusters.
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Figure 10: Percentage of stability
Percentage of MPR Nodes. The MPR is a node selected by the cluster-head to serve as a
relaying point during the communications among clusters. It also includes the cluster-head
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Figure 12: Packet Delivery Ratio
itself. Fig. 9 shows that the cluster-based models (VANET QoS-OLSR and QoS-OLSR)
give a reduced percentage of MPR nodes since these multi-points relay are selected by
a limited number of nodes namely the cluster-heads. Similarly, the VANET QoS-OLSR
outperforms the QoS-OLSR by reducing the percentage of MPRs around 20%. This result
can be justified by the fact that VANET QoS-OLSR multiplies the QoS function by the
connectivity factor. This would lead to elect the MPRs having higher connectivity which
reduces the need for electing wide set MPR nodes. In contrary, the QOLSR model divides
the bandwidth by the number of neighbor nodes which will affect the protocol performance
and raise the need for a larger set of MPRs. By reducing the number of MPRs, the VANET
QoS-OLSR is decreasing the jamming over the network produced by the large number of
exchanged TC messages. Therefore, this model seems to be efficient for dense networks.
Percentage of Stability. The percentage of stability is obtained by dividing the number
of current nodes in each cluster by the previous number of nodes in the same cluster be-
fore a slot of time. If 60% or above of the nodes are still in the cluster, then the cluster
is considered stable. Otherwise, it is considered unstable. Fig. 10 reveals that VANET
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QoS-OLSR increases the percentage of clusters stability as the number of nodes increase.
This result can be justified by the fact that our model takes into consideration the distance
factor proportionally to the adopted velocity while calculating the QoS function. Hence in-
creasing the distance and decreasing the velocity leads to a better QoS value. Multiplying
by the distance factor guarantees that the clusters are formed by vehicles having convergent
distance to traverse before reaching the destination. It guarantees as well that cluster-heads
and MPRs have a considerable remaining distance to traverse in order to avoid the frequent
disconnections. Dividing by the velocity ensures that vehicles violating speed limits have
less chance to be cluster-heads or MPRs and that nodes belonging to the same cluster must
have a convergent scale of speed.
Path Length. The path length is the average number of hops needed to transfer data
between the source and destination. This factor reflects the End-to-End delay. In our
protocol, the optimal path between a given source and destination is chosen according to the
highest QoS value and the least expected route time. Fig. 11 describes the average number
of hops yielded by the three protocols (VANET QoS-OLSR, QoS-OLSR and QOLSR)
after sending messages from ten random sources to ten random destinations. The shown
results prove that the VANET QoS-OLSR model gives less number of hops compared to
other models. This improvement is earned by considering the route time while calculating
the pheromone value used to select the MPRs. Moreover, using Ant Colony Optimization
guarantees that the shortest path will still be chosen until a link failure occurs due to the
fact that this path will get marched by ants over and over again and reinforced hence by
more pheromone values.
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Packet Deliver Ratio. In order to evaluate the efficiency of any routing algorithm, two
major metrics should be considered: the End-to-End delay and the packet delivery ratio.
We evaluate in this part the efficiency of the MPRs selection algorithm by measuring the
packet delivery ratio yielded by this algorithm. The packet delivery ratio is obtained by
dividing the total number of received packets by the total number of sent packets. Fig. 12
reveals that VANET QoS-OLSR is able to increase this ratio. This is due to the fact that
it is able to increase the connectivity, maintain the stability, and decrease the End-to-End
delay compared to the other approaches.
Table 8: Bandwidth Average Difference
Models
Transmission Ranges
150 200 300
Classical QOLSR 0% 0% 0%
QoS-OLSR 7:03% 4:53% 3:90%
VANET QoS-OLSR 7:08% 4:3% 3:92%
The Bandwidth Average Difference. The bandwidth average difference can be defined
as the bandwidth difference between the path having the maximal bandwidth value and
the path currently selected. Thus, the decrease of this aspect improves the Quality of
Service over the network. Table 8 presents the percentage average difference for a 100
nodes network using the three scenarios: VANET QoS-OLSR, clustered QoS-OLSR, and
without clustering QOLSR. According to this table, the classical QOLSR model shows a
zero percentage average difference since the best path is selected according to the optimal
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bandwidth path. The two remaining models show almost similar percentage of average dif-
ference with a slight advantage for the QoS-OLSR over VANET QoS-OLSR with a trans-
mission range of 150 and 300 meters. For 200 meters of transmission range, the VANET
QoS-OLSR model shows a better average difference around 0.23%. In the light of these
results, we can notice that the average difference given by VANET QoS-OLSR is not such
big. Moreover, this value is tolerable since in this model we need to combine the bandwidth
with a bunch of other important metrics (speed, connectivity and distance) to ensure other
important factors namely the stability, congestion and delay.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed VANET QoS-OLSR protocol that aims at maintaining the sta-
bility of the vehicular network while achieving the Quality of Service requirements. The
protocol is composed of two components: (1) QoS-based clustering using Ant Colony Op-
timization, and (2) MPR recovery algorithm. To ensure the stability of clusters, we add the
velocity and distance that represent the mobility metrics to the QoS function. Thereafter,
the protocol elects the cluster-heads according to the local maximal QoS value. The cluster-
heads select then a set of optimal MPRs satisfying both mobility and routing constraints
according to an Ant Colony Optimization algorithm. Finally, a MPR recovery algorithm
is introduced to select alternatives and keep the network connected in case of link fail-
ures. Simulation results prove that our protocol is able to extend the network lifetime up to
12%, reduce the percentage of selected MPRs by 20%, increase the packet delivery ratio
by 10%, and decrease the path length up to 2-hops. However, the faithful application of
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this clustering protocol is not guaranteed. In fact, some vehicles (cluster-heads and MPRs)
may behave selfishly by refusing to cooperate with the other vehicles in the networking
functions. This misbehavior would hamper the clustering objectives and entrain negative
implications on the network lifetime, stability, overhead, and delay. Therefore, we propose
in chapter 4 the VANET-DSDmodel that (1) detects the misbehaving vehicles after clusters
formation, and (2) regulates the cooperation in the network.
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Chapter 4
A Dempster-Shafer based Tit-for-Tat
Strategy to Regulate the Cooperation
4.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the problem of selfish nodes in VANET using our proposed cluster-
ing protocol VANET QoS-OLSR. According to this protocol, nodes might behave selfishly
either during the clusters formation by claiming bogus information or after clusters’ forma-
tion by speeding up or down the road average speed limit. Several contributions have been
proposed to tackle this problem during clusters formation such as [47] and [48]. In this
thesis, we address the problem of selfish nodes after the clusters are formed. In this case,
the nodes may refuse to cooperate with each other and serve as cluster-heads or MPRs in
order to save their time and resources. Such behavior will entrain negative implications
on the percentage of MPRs, percentage of stability, percentage of clusters’ disconnections,
and end-to-end delay as depicted in figures 13, 14, 15, and 16, respectively.
57
Fig. 13 depicts the impact of selfish nodes on the percentage of elected MPRs. The plot
indicates that the clusters need to elect more number of MPRs as long as the number of
misbehaving vehicles increases in the network. This is because the clusters do not stand up
a long time due to the high mobility of the selfish nodes. Fig. 14 reveals that the increase
in the number of selfish nodes will deteriorate the stability of the network gradually. This
is due to the fact that the over-speeding nodes move quickly to other clusters while the
under-speeding nodes remain for a long time in the same cluster.
Fig. 15 shows that the percentage of disconnected cluster-heads increases in conjunc-
tion with the increase in the percentage of selfish vehicles due to the high mobility of the
selfish MPRs connecting the clusters. Finally, Fig. 16 describes the impact of selfish vehi-
cles on the End-to-End delay represented in terms of average number of hops. It is obvious
that this delay increases considerably as the percentage of selfish nodes increases. Suppose,
for instance, a path between two clusters composed of three MPR nodes MPR1, MP2,
andMPR3. Suppose that theMPR2 decided to over speed. The path connecting the two
clusters will then break down and the intended packets between the two clusters will not be
received on time.
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As a solution, we propose a model that is able to detect misbehaving nodes after clusters
are formed, and regulate the cooperation in the network. To detect misbehaving vehicles
after clusters’ formation, cooperative watchdog model based on Dempster-Shafer is mod-
eled where evidences are aggregated and cooperative decision is made. After detecting the
misbehaving vehicles, there should be a mechanism able to regulate the cooperation by
punishing the misbehaving vehicles and rewarding the cooperative vehicles. Classical and
generous Tit-for-Tats are proposed to analyze the interaction among vehicles. However,
both strategies are not able to enforce the cooperation due the fact that they (1) count on in-
dividual watchdogs monitoring, (2) rely on the node-to-node cooperation decision, (3) and
ignore the high mobility and packet collisions. Therefore, we propose a Dempster-Shafer
based Tit-for-Tat strategy that is able to improve the decision and regulate the cooperation in
the vehicular network. This is done by (1) launching a cooperative watchdogs monitoring,
(2) correlating the observations of the different watchdogs using Dempster-Shafer theory,
and (3) propagating the decisions among clusters. Thereafter, we compare the Dempster-
Shafer based strategy with several strategies derived from the original Tit-for-Tat.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the proposed
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approach in details, explains the model used for simulation, and presents empirical results.
Section 4.3 gives an illustrative example to show our model works. Finally, Section 4.4
concludes the chapter.
4.2 VANET-DSD Model
In this section, we describe the VANET Dempster-Shafer Detection (VANET-DSD) model.
The model starts with modeling the packet forwarding problem in VANET as a game the-
ory without and with collisions. Thereafter, we present the Tit-for-Tat strategies proposed
to detect the misbehaving vehicles after clusters formation as well as to regulate the coop-
eration.
4.2.1 The Game Model Without Packet Collisions
Game theory [35] is a formal study of conflict and cooperation that applies whenever the
actions of several peers are interdependent. In Vehicular Ad hoc Networks, vehicles are
independent nodes, making decisions about cooperating or not. While building these deci-
sions, nodes may behave selfishly paying attention for only their own interests. This makes
the objectives of the different nodes conflicting (some nodes need to be served and oth-
ers consider that their interests lie in being uncooperative). Thus, the application of game
theory in dealing with selfish nodes in VANET may be straightforward, as game theory
usually analyzes situations in which player purposes are in conflict. Therefore, we decided
to model the cooperation among nodes in VANET as non-cooperative repeated game where
the players are the set of head and MPR nodes responsible for relaying the packets. These
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nodes are assumed to be rational or selfish; namely, they seek to maximize their own payoff,
not to cause damage for the other nodes. The game can be modeled as follows. The desired
outcome of the game is achieved if the routing is done along a continuous path without any
packet dropping. The players are the head and MPR nodes that cooperate in the packets
forwarding inside the network. The group of players is a finite set that we denote byN and
single players are indicated by i 2 N . Ai is used to indicate the set of all potential actions
of i while ai denotes the action done by player i. Each participant has to choose either to
forward the packet or to drop it; thus, Ai={Forward,Drop}.
Definition: A Packet Relaying Game in VANET is
G = hN; fdig; fGigi
where:
 N denotes the collection of players
 0  di  1 represents the dropping probability of player i
 Gi is the gain or payoff of player i
Since relaying consumes node’s bandwidth, time, and storage space, Forward action should
entail a cost. We assume this cost to be -1. Drop action, conversely, does not involve a cost.
Additionally, successfully forwarded packets yield a gain of  > 0, whereas dropping
the packets costs  . In such a way, the game is characterized by the fact that the Drop
action strictly dominates the Forward action. Indeed, when both players ignore each others
decisions their best strategy resides in choosing to drop in the intention to avoid the  1
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cost (Table 9) which is the worst case since:
 >    1 >   >     1 (1)
Thus, the strategy (Drop,Drop) represents the Nash Equilibrium [36] since no player can
find its profit by deviating from it.
Lemma: The Nash Equilibrium in the Packet Forwarding Game represents the recipro-
cal defection, i.e., di = 1 for i = 1; 2 is the unique Nash Equilibrium for the game G.
This leads us to the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma [37] identified by the payoff matrix pre-
sented in Table 10, in addition to the following inequalities:
1) T > R > P > S.
2) R > T+S
2
.
Hence, the packet forwarding game is equals to the Prisoner’s Dilemma if and only if:
1) Equation (1) is valid
2)    1 >   1+
2
=)    1 >  1
2
=)  > 1
2
Since the Nash Equilibrium is achieved with the strategy (Drop,Drop), the rational player
will always drop the packets if the game is played once. However, if the game is played
infinitely this is not the case. Nonetheless, the packet forwarding game cannot resemble
the classical version of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game [37]. This is due the fact that the
interaction in the traditional Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is basically synchronous, while
the forwarding model necessitates an asynchronous interaction. Following the alternating
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game [38], the symmetry between the players is broken. In fact, two players can alterna-
tively forward and receive packets. In such a case, the payoff values for one unit are like
those in one round of simultaneous Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Reward R = u + i
Punishment P = o + p
Temptation T = o + i
Sucker S = u + p
where u is a negative payoff representing the forwarding cost, i is a positive payoff repre-
senting the reward of being cooperated (served), o is null payoff representing the cost of
dropping, and p is a negative payoff representing the cost of being defected (not served).
F D
F (   1;    1) (    1; )
D (;    1) ( ; )
Table 9: Payoff matrix of the Packet Relaying Game
C D
C (R;R) (S; T )
D (T; S) (P; P )
Table 10: Payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
4.2.2 The Game Model With Packet Collisions
A major problem may face the implementation of the reputation-based strategies which is
the packets collisions [39]. This problem that may prevent the players from successfully
hearing a packet being forwarded could occur in different scenarios.
Scenario 1 : Suppose that node V3 is monitoring its 1-hop away neighbor, node V2.
As depicted in Fig. 17, node V3 is located within the transmission range of node V2 and
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Figure 17: Collision Scenario
therefore node V3 can use promiscuous monitoring to detect whether node V2 is forwarding
packets as expected. Now assume that node V3 has sent a packet to node V2 to be for-
warded later to node V1 and is waiting to see if node V2 will relay the packet to node V1 or
not. simultaneously, vehicle V3 is within the transmission range of vehicle V4. If vehicle V4
decided to forward some packets at the same time vehicle V2 is transmitting vehicle V3’s
packet to vehicle V1, then vehicle V3, which is monitoring vehicle V2, will observe a colli-
sion of vehicle V2’s and V4’s transmission and will thus be unable to observe vehicle V2’s
transmission. Vehicle V2’s transmission to V1 might actually have been successful since
node V4 is out of range of both vehicles V1 and V2. However, although V2 forwarded the
packet as expected, vehicle V3 did not see that. Consequently, node V3 may misleadingly
accuse vehicle V2 to be selfishly dropping the packet.
Scenario 2 : The collision may occur also if at the same time vehicle V2 attempts to
forward a packet to vehicle V1, vehicle V1 relays a packet. That will cause a collision that
forbids vehicle V3 from determining whether it is within V1’s transmission range or not.
If vehicle V2 does not retransmit the packet, vehicle V1 will not receive the packet. Thus,
vehicle V3 actually thinks that V2 has successfully transmitted the packet and therefore will
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not be able to identify node V2’s malicious packet dropping behavior. Thus, vehicle V2 can
launch such collisions intentionally in order to hamper V3’s promiscuous monitoring. For
instance, V2 may wait until vehicle V1 begins forwarding a packet to initiate the transmis-
sion for vehicle V3’s packet, generating thus an intentional collision.
We model this situation using a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with Noise [40]. However,
in such a game the real dropping probability di of a node is unknown to the other nodes
due to the ambiguity caused by both high mobility and collisions. We incorporate therefore
the notion of perceived defection rate [41] to prevent the nodes from overestimating di in
order to earn an excuse for being uncooperative. Let  indicate the probability at time t
with which each node tries to transmit. The Perceived Defection of player i at stage k, is
represented by p^(k)i , is:
p^
(k)
i =  + (1  ) d(k)i
If the Tit-for-Tat strategy is applied, the situation will end up with a mutual deadlock where
no node will cooperate with any other one. In fact, two players playing Tit-for-Tat will
“cooperate on the first move, then do what the opponent did in the last move”. Thus, a
strategy is Tit-For-Tat if:
 d(0)i = 0 (cooperate on the first move)
 d(k)i = d(k 1)j for k > 0 (do what the opponent j did in the last move)
Thus, we can write the following equations:
 Initially, the two players cooperate:
d
(0)
1 = d
(0)
2 = 0
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 The high mobility or the packet collisions will cause the perceived defection of the
player to be:
p^
(0)
1 = p^
(0)
2 = 
 At stage 1, a mutual punishment will take place and the defection probability will be:
d
(1)
1 = d
(1)
2 = 
 The perceived defection will hence be:
p^
(1)
1 = p^
(1)
2 =  + (1  ) 
 At stage k, the dropping probability of each player will be:
d
(k)
1 = d
(k)
2 = 1  (1  )k
 and the perceived defection will be:
p^
(k)
1 = p^
(k)
2 = 1  (1  )k+1
As the number of iterations in iterated Tit-for-Tat tends to infinity, we get:
d1 = d2 = lim
k!1
d
(k)
1 = lim
k!1
d
(k)
2 = 1 (2)
We follow in this work the infinite backlog queuing model [42] where each node sep-
arates the packets originating from itself from the transit packets originating from other
neighbors by allocating an independent queue for each type of packets. Therefore we are
able to assume in the above calculations that the traffic load  is a constant that does not
rely on the dropping probability di.
The equation 2 reveals that two playing Tit-for-Tat will end up with mutual punishment
even when both players want to cooperate. A way to deal with this issue is by using a more
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generous strategy able to break the mutual retaliation problem. Such a strategy is called
Generous TFT (GTFT) [35]. According to this strategy, a cooperative player will cooperate
with another player at a regular basis of k movements regardless of their previous history.
Moreover, only one cooperation in the past k decisions is enough to consider the other
player cooperative. Although this approach is efficient with nodes that do not cooperate at
all, it allows the selfish nodes to mimic the behavior of cooperative nodes by cooperating
once every time they notice that their history become full of defections. Therefore, we
propose in the following a Dempster-Shafer based Tit-for-Tat model that is able to accu-
rately detect and punish the selfish nodes in VANET in the presence of collisions and high
mobility and without giving the misbehaving nodes the chance to imitate the behavior of
cooperative nodes.
4.2.3 Tit-for-Tat Strategies
In this section, we explain the settings and introduce the assumptions that we considered
when formulating the game. We describe then the details of the implementation and the
scenarios we followed during the simulations. Thereafter, we analyze the behavior of the
VANET nodes using different Tit-for-Tat strategies in order to select the best strategy able
to enforce the cooperation in VANET in the presence of high mobility and collisions. This
can be achieved by increasing the gain of cooperative node and decreasing the gain of
selfish nodes.
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Set-up and simulation scenarios
Consider that we have a group of N participants (cluster-heads and MPRs) in a packet re-
laying game, each participant is a member of one cluster at a time and the routing is done
according to a clustered-based QoS-OLSR protocol [17]. Each participant is able to:
1) Forward a packet.
2) Drop a packet because of the inability to forward such as lack of bandwidth, transmis-
sion power, or time.
3) Drop a packet although it is able to relay it. Such behavior is known as “selfish” or “ra-
tional”. These nodes represent a threat for the stability and the functioning of the network
as shown in the section 4.1.
The game will run for 24 hours (86400 iterations) where each iteration represents a
second. At each iteration (t), only one node (source) may demand a forwarding request.
So, at time t, a randomly selected participant i, makes a request r. The relay nodes (heads
or MPRs) can either decline the request or cooperate by forwarding the packets. In the
former case, a participant j can be selfish or, simply, does not have sufficient resources
(bandwidth, storage space, time). In the latter case, a participant j decides to cooperate and
forward the packet according to the past history of node i (the expression of this fact differs
between the proposed strategies). According to their cooperation in the game, the gain of
the nodes is calculated. To do so, we take every 10 minutes (600 iterations) an average of
the accumulated gain to obtain in total 144 plot points (84600
600
) along the 24 hours.
We follow the following asynchronous prisoner’s dilemma game while evaluating the
different strategies:
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 We have a total of 100 heads and MPRs where the percentage of selfish nodes varies
from 0% to 50%.
 At each iteration, a non-requesting cooperative vehicle j would relay a packet with a
probability of 0 < Pr < 15 . Each participant has his own Pr value ranging from 0 to
1
5
. The values of Pr are distributed normally among the participants to simulate the
variability among them. This variability expresses the probability of a participant’s
ability to relay a packet according to several constraints such as enough bandwidth,
storage space, or even time (e.g., a participant (driver) may has an urgent case that
forbids him from wasting his time by forwarding packets).
 86400 requests are made sequentially.
 In each iteration, a particular source node is chosen randomly to make a request.
Thus, the probability of requesting is Ps = 1100 , for any given node.
 This participant may request one or more packets to be forwarded. If a node receives
more than one packet at a time it will save them into the transit queue according to
the infinite backlog queuing model (Section 4.2.2).
In the following, we define the game parameters that can satisfy the conditions of the
asynchronous repeated prisoners dilemma game:
 Forwarding Cost: u = -1
 Drop Cost: o = 0
 Gain from a fulfilled request: i =  = number of packets supposed to be trans-
ferred/request
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 Loss from a non-fulfilled request: p = - = -(number of packets supposed to be
transferred/request)
The number of packets supposed to be transferred per request may be obtained by dividing
the available bandwidth at node x by the mean packet size which we suppose it to be 1kb;
that is, if the available bandwidth at node x is 1Mb and the mean packet size is 1kb then the
number of packets supposed to be transferred by this node is 1Mb
1kb
=1000kb
1kb
= 1000 packets.
Note that the parameter u is given a negative value to represent the cost of responding to
a request since it requires resources (bandwidth, storage space) and time to relay a packet.
The parameter o is hence greater than u which means that dropping the packet would be
more beneficial for the rational vehicle. Furthermore, o   u is less than i   p showing
that the cost of serve (cooperate) is less than the benefit of being served. Therefore, for
the longer term, rational users are better off cooperating with each other. Recall that the
parameter i which is equals to  is satisfying the aforementioned constraint allowing our
packet forwarding game to be equivalent to a Prisoner’s Dilemma game ( > 1
2
and  >
   1 >   >     1).
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The gain of the cooperative nodes is affected by the behavior of the selfish nodes. To
show impact of such behavior on the gain of cooperative vehicles, we consider five different
scenarios.
 Scenario 1: There are 100 vehicles and all of them are cooperative.
 Scenario 2: There are 100 vehicles, 80% of them are cooperative and 20% are selfish.
 Scenario 3: There are 100 vehicles, 70% of them are cooperative and 30% are selfish.
 Scenario 4: There are 100 vehicles, 60% of them are cooperative and 40% are selfish.
 Scenario 5: There are 100 vehicles, 50% of them are cooperative and 50% are selfish.
The number of selfish nodes used in the simulations varies from 0% to 50% of the total
nodes. For 0% of selfish nodes, we simulate the behavior of cooperative nodes. From 10%
to 50% of selfish nodes, the impact of the misbehaving nodes will be catastrophic on the
network as depicted in the section 3. Above 50%, the misbehaving nodes will form the
majority and their negative impact begins to diminish gradually since they can meet again,
form new clusters, and resume the network functions anew.
Concerning the simulation scenario, we use the scenario described in Chapter 3 to sim-
ulate the Tit-for-Tat strategies.
Fig. 18 describes the impact of the existence of selfish nodes on the gain of the coop-
erative vehicles. As depicted in the figure, this gain will decrease gradually as long as the
percentage of selfish nodes is increasing. This loss can be turned into gain if the selfish
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users were somehow forced to cooperate. Here lies the importance of developing a co-
operation enforcement model that can stimulate the nodes cooperating and achieving their
common interests.
Traditional Tit-for-Tat
According to this strategy, the node starts by cooperating, and then imitates the behavior of
its opponent in the prior iterations. In an iterated game, we assume that each participant j
maintains the historic records Hj i(k) of the lastK actions with another participant i. If the
accumulated value from Hj i(1) to Hj i(k) exceeds k2 , player i is deemed cooperative and
player j will decide to cooperate with player i; otherwise, player j will refuse to cooperate.
However, the cooperation decision depends as well on other factors such as the storage
space and the available resources. Let Rj i(t) be the forwarding request made from i to j at
time t. Formally, vehicle j cooperates by responding to i0s request Rj i(t) if (1) the current
transit queue of j is not full i.e. Q(j) < C(j) where Q(j) is the current transit queue of i
and C(i) is the storage capacity of i, (2) j has B(j) available resources (bandwidth), and
(3) node i was cooperative with j0s requests in the last k iterations i.e. max
1hk
Hj i(h). Let
Dij(t) describes the decision taken by player i to cooperate with player j or not, we can
write the following equation:
Dij(t) = min

Q(j) < C(j); B(j); max
1hk
Hj i(h)

Fig. 19 illustrates the progress of total gain of cooperative nodes over the time. It
reveals that that this gain begins by an increase until reaching 1 h and 30 min (100 min-
utes). Starting from this time, the payoff of the cooperative nodes reaches a deadlock and
begins to decrease as proven in the section 4.2.2. In fact, at this time each vehicle will
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Figure 19: Classical Tit-for-Tat
have a bad history of all other nodes and will hence refrain from cooperating at all. This
justifies the continuous decrease of the gain till the end caused by the loss from a non-
fulfilled forwarding request coefficient which is equal to -(number of packets supposed to
be transferred/request).
Generous Tit-for-Tat
The classical version of Tit-for-Tat strategy suffers from several limitations. First, this strat-
egy will end up with a mutual deadlock where no node will cooperate with any other node
as proven before. Moreover, according to this strategy, a vehicle can, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, (1) betray its opponent (false positive), (2) cooperate in error (false negative),
or (3) getting misinterpreted (collisions). To overcome the problems related to deadlock,
false positives and false negatives, several enhancements have been made to the original
Tit-for-Tat. Generous Tit-for-Tat (GTFT) [43], is a variation of the traditional Tit-for-Tat.
This strategy forgives periodic defections with a certain probability. If two nodes playing
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Tit for Tat strategy against one another and one of them defects by mistake or due to col-
lisions, this would result in a long series of mutual punishment where both players fail to
profit. In contrast, if the same situation happens for two players of the Generous Tit-for-Tat
strategy or one Generous Tit-for-Tat player and one Tit-for-Tat player, the reciprocal pun-
ishment series will end as soon as the Generous Tit-for-Tat player responds to the defection
by cooperation in the next round. Thus, the cooperative player i of GTFT cooperates at a
regular basis of k movements with the other player j regardless of the prior history from
Hj i(1) to Hj i(k). In addition, instead of waiting k2 cooperations to consider a player coop-
erative in the classical Tit-for-Tat, one cooperation is enough in GTFT to assume the other
player cooperative. Let fj i(t) be a fulfilled request by vehicle j to vehicle i at time t. The
GTFT corresponds to the following equation:
Dj i(t) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
min

Q(j) < C(j); B(j); max
1hk
Hj i(h)

if Hj i(h) 6= ;; for some h;
fj i(t) every k requests(bonus);
0 otherwise
Fig. 20 reveals that the total gain of the cooperative nodes is somehow close to the
optimal upper bound compared to the traditional Tit-for-Tat. The figure shows also that
this strategy does not cause a deadlock as observed in the traditional Tit-for-Tat. This is
due to the generous characteristics preventing the cooperative users from having mutual
bad history of each others in the sense that only one cooperation in the short past history is
needed to consider a node cooperative. The generous strategy is good in the case of having
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tit-for-tat.eps
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
x 106
Minutes
To
ta
l G
a
in
 
fo
r 
No
de
s
 
 
20% Selfish
30% Selfish
40% Selfish
50% Selfish
Figure 20: Generous Tit-for-Tat
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Figure 21: Selfish vs. cooperative
selfish users that do not cooperate at all. Indeed, even the generous behavior results in them
getting served every k turns, the cumulative loss of the nodes of not getting served is much
higher which results in the drop of their total gain over the time. However, selfish nodes
may try to mimic the behavior of cooperative vehicles. Thus, every time a selfish node
notices that its history is full of defections, it cooperates once. Such behavior will break
the strategy objectives and make the selfish nodes indistinguishable from the cooperative
ones. This gives the selfish nodes a gain higher than the cooperative ones since these nodes
are saving their resources and getting a gain similar to the cooperative nodes as depicted in
Fig. 21. Consequently, the rational vehicles will find that their interest lies in the defection.
Thus, the game goes on vicious circle.
Tit-for-k-Tats
Tit-for-Two-Tats [35] is a new form of generous Tit-for-Tat. The difference between these
two strategies is the degree of generosity the strategy follows. In the traditional form of
Tit-for-Tat, a node responds by defecting once it detects that its opponent has defected in
the previous round. This has the effect of producing mutual retaliation which would result
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in a poor outcome for both players. A Tit-for-Two-Tats player will forgive first defection in
order to break the deadlock of the Tit-for-Tat strategy. Then, if the opponent defects twice
consecutively, the Tit-for-Two-Tats bearer will defect in response.
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Figure 22: Tit-for-two-Tats
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
x 106
Minutes
To
ta
l G
a
in
 
fo
r 
N
o
de
s
 
 
Cooperative Gain
Selfish Gain
Figure 23: Selfish vs. cooperative
Fig. 22 depicts that the gain yielded by the Tit-for-Two-Tats strategy is close to the gain
generated by the Generous Tit-for-Tat. Fig. 23 shows the impact of Tit-for-Two-Tats on
the gain of both cooperative and selfish nodes. It reveals that the strategy will end up with
the selfish nodes having a higher gain than the cooperative nodes.
Table 11: Average gain of cooperative nodes with different percentages of selfish nodes
K
Percentage of selfish nodes
20% 30% 40% 50%
2 1969000 1537100 1105100 673100
4 2098700 1666700 1234700 802700
6 2185100 1753100 1321100 889100
8 1969000 1537100 1105100 673100
10 2746700 2314700 1882700 1450700
Therefore, We extended this approach by varying “k” to study the impact of increasing
the number of “tats”. We vary “k” from 2 to 10. The name of the strategy changes with the
variation of the number of tats to be respectively: Tit-for-Four-Tats, Tit-for-Six-Tats, Tit-
for-Eight-Tats, and Tit-for-Ten-Tats. Note that in the following we take the average gain for
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Table 12: Comparison between the average gain of cooperative nodes and selfish nodes
K Gain of Cooperative Nodes Gain of Selfish Nodes
2 1776700 1969000
4 1976800 2098700
6 2068800 2185100
8 2309300 2401100
10 2676500 2746700
each strategy and we group them into tables because of space constraints. Table 11 reveals
that the average gain of cooperative nodes in the different strategies is close somehow to
the optimal upper bound and that this gain increases as the number of tats “k” increases.
That is, increasing the number of “tats” increases the generosity of the strategy. However,
by looking at Table 12, we notice that the average gain of selfish nodes in the different
strategies exceeds the average gain of cooperative nodes and that increasing the number of
tats is able only to delay the time at which the gain of selfish nodes will exceed the gain of
cooperative nodes but not to prevent it. This is justified by the fact that the selfish nodes
will try repeatedly to cooperate in “k” requests (according to the number of tats used in the
strategy) among the “n” requests in order to avoid being punished. Thus, by cooperating
“k” times and saving resources (defecting) “k-n” times the gain of the selfish nodes will
exceed the gain of cooperative nodes that cooperate and spend their resources “n” times.
Dempster-Shafer based Tit-for-Tat
After being elected as heads and MPRs, some nodes prefer to do not cooperate in the
packets forwarding for selfish purposes. These nodes have dramatic implications on the
network. Several approaches have been advanced in the literature to stimulate the cooper-
ation of these node. The traditional version of Tit-for-Tat strategy is not able to deal with
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this problem since it will end up with a mutual deadlock where no vehicle will cooperate
with any other one. The Generous Tit-for-Tat, in turn, which was proposed to prevent the
deadlock caused by the traditional Tit-for-Tat, is still insufficient to solve the problem. In
fact, the selfish nodes may exploit the generosity of this strategy to mimic the behavior of
well-behaving nodes in order to avoid the punishments. This will give the selfish nodes a
gain higher than the cooperative ones and will push the rational nodes to behave selfishly.
The Tit-for-K-Tats is able to delay the time when the gain of selfish nodes exceeds the gain
of cooperative nodes but not to prevent it. Moreover, all these strategies do not operate
neither under high mobility nor under packets collisions. In order to overcome these limi-
tations, we propose a Dempster-Shafer Based Tit-for-Tat model. This model is made up of
five phases: reputation calculation, watchdogs monitoring, votes aggregation, Tit-for-Tat
cooperation regulation, and information dissemination.
Reputation Calculation : Based on the reward and punishment principle, each
node is assigned a value called reputation. This value is set initially to 100 for all the nodes
and is increased continuously whenever a node receives a payment from its voters. The
payment is received by the nodes once elected as cluster-heads or MPRs. The payment of
heads is expressed as the difference between the QoS value of the voted node (cluster-head)
and the QoS value of the next best candidate among its neighbor nodes (the node having
the next maximal local QoS value other than the head). The payment of cluster-heads is
explained in Algorithm 6.
On the other hand, the MPR node that connects the 2-hop away cluster heads should be
paid by each of the two head node according to Algorithm 7.
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Algorithm 6 Cluster-heads Payment Algorithm
1: Initialization:
2: Let x be an elected cluster-head node.
3: Let Rt(x) be the reputation of node x at time t.
4: Let P (j) represent the payment offered by node j.
5: Let N1(x) represent the two-hop away nodes from x.
6: procedure HEADPAYMENT
7: for each j 2 N1(x) [ fxg do
8: P (j) = QoS(x) maxfQoS(k)jk 2 N1(j) [ fjgg
9: Rt+1(x) = Rt(x) + P (j)
10: end for
11: end procedure
Algorithm 7 Payment Algorithm for MPRs Connecting 2-hop Clusters
1: Initialization:
2: Let CH2(u) be the 2-hop away nodes from u.
3: Let x be an elected MPR node for the nodes in CH2(k).
4: Let u be an elected cluster head.
5: Let w be an elected cluster head.
6: Let Rt(x) be the reputation of node x at time t.
7: Let P (u) be the payment offered by head node u.
8: Let N1(x) represent the one-hop away nodes from x.
9: procedure TWOHOPMPRPAYMENT
10: The path (u; x; w) maximizes QoS(x) among all paths connecting u to w.
11: P (u) = (QoS(x) maxfQoS(j)jj 2 N1(u)
T
N1(w)g.
12: P (w) = (QoS(x) maxfQoS(j)jj 2 N1(u)
T
N1(w)g.
13: Rt+1(x) = Rt(x) + P (u) + P (w)
14: end procedure
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The payment received by the MPR nodes connecting 3-hop away cluster heads is estab-
lished according the minimum QoS value of the new interconnecting path once the actual
selected MPR node has been taken away. The payment of these MPRs is explained in
Algorithm 8.
The reputation accumulates over the time. Thus, we denote the reputation of a node x
by: Rt+1(x) = Rt(x) + P (x). Thus, the cooperative nodes will be continuously increas-
ing their reputation values. In contrary, if a selfish node decides to cooperate for only a
short period, its reputation will gradually evaporate. Thereafter, the nodes are granted the
network services proportionally to their reputation values. Thus, the access to the network
resources for the selfish nodes will be limited. Note that dividing by the reputation values
of the neighboring nodes ensures the fairness among the nodes to have the same chance of
getting services. For example, if the available bandwidth in the network is 1000Mb/s and
there are three neighbor nodes having reputation values of 109, 130,116 respectively. The
total reputation in the network is then 109+130+116=355. Thus, the reputation ratios of
the nodes are 109
355
, 130
355
, and 116
355
respectively. The first node will get a bandwidth share of
109
355
 1000. The bandwidth share of the second node will be 130
355
 1000 while the share of
the third node will be 116
355
 1000 with 109
355
 1000+ 130
355
 1000+ 116
355
 1000 = 1000Mb/s.
Watchdogs Monitoring : In the watchdogs monitoring phase, each 1-hop away
neighbor node is designated as watchdog to monitor the behavior of all head and MPR
nodes situating within its transmission range. These watchdog nodes can overhear the com-
munications between nodes locating in their transmission ranges. Hence, each watchdog
node specifies an expected time for the packet to be sent.
After the expiry of this time, the watchdog that maintains a buffer of recently sent
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Algorithm 8 Payment Algorithm for MPRs Connecting 3-hop Clusters
1: Initialization:
2: Let CH3(k) be the 3-hop away nodes from k.
3: Let x and y be elected MPR nodes for the nodes in CH3(k).
4: Let k be an elected cluster head.
5: Let l be an elected cluster head.
6: Let R(i) be the reputation of node i.
7: Let P (k) be the payment offered by the head node k.
8: procedure THREEHOPMPRPAYMENT
9: The path (k; x1; y1; l) maximizesmin(QoS(x1); QoS(y1)) among all paths connecting k to l.
10: The path (k; x2; y2; l) maximizes min(QoS(x2); QoS(y2)) among all paths connecting k to l and
min(QoS(x2); QoS(y2)) < min(QoS(x1); QoS(y1)).
11: Rt+1(x) = Rt(x) + P (k) + P (l).
12: Rt+1(y) = Rt(y) + P (k) + P (l).
13: end procedure
packets will compare each overheard packet with the packet in the buffer to see if there is
a match. If so, this means that the packet was delivered correctly and the watchdog will
mark the sender head or MPR as “cooperative”. Otherwise, it will not mark this head or
MPR as “selfish” directly but it will accuse it to be “suspicious” awaiting the observations
from the other watchdogs to build the final decision.
In fact, some out of control factors may affect the work of watchdogs namely the high
mobility of vehicles and the collision problem depicted in the section 4.2.2. Some vehicles
may, for example, increase their speed to prevent the watchdogs from detecting whether
they are transmitting the packets or not. Furthermore, it may happen, for instance, that
some packets are not received within the expected time due to packets collisions. In these
cases, the watchdogs may accuse innocent nodes to be misbehaving unjustly and vice versa.
Moreover, some heads and MPRs will cooperate with some nodes and defect with other
nodes. Thus, these nodes are rewarded by some watchdogs and punished by others. In
such a way, the selfish nodes will find a balance between cooperating and defecting in or-
der to maximize their gain. Therefore, relying only on the opinion of individual watchdogs
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is unable to regulate the cooperating inside the network but only to punish some nodes tem-
porarily. Here lies the importance of aggregating the observations from different watchdogs
in order to build a final collective decision. We present hence the votes aggregation phase.
Votes Aggregation : In this phase, the observations from the different watchdogs are
aggregated to form up a final unified decision. This can be done by launching a local voting
process among the watchdogs situating in the same cluster. Nonetheless, the aggregation
technique should take into account that some nodes may be intentionally or unintentionally
untrustworthy. Namely, in addition to the deception caused by the collisions, some watch-
dogs may be selfish themselves and give false information to satisfy some egoist objectives.
In fact, the voter watchdog may say that a head or MPR is cooperative while it is not if a
plot between these two nodes took place. Similarly, some other voters may accuse cooper-
ative heads or MPRs to be misbehaving unjustly with the intention of excluding them from
being competitors in any future election procedure. Therefore, there must be a distinction
between trustworthy and untrustworthy voters.
To do so, we have chosen the Dempster-Shafer theory [44] of evidences to be used
while aggregating the watchdog votes. Dempster-Shafer is a mathematical model that is
characterized by considering the uncertain evidences and by its ability to aggregate the
evidences from independent sources. The motivation behind using Dempster-Shafer in
the cooperation regulation in VANET can be summarized as follows: (1) the usefulness
of Dempster-Shafer to represent and combine differen types of evidences coming from
indpendent sources, (2) the fact that Dempster-Shafer represents uncertain evidences makes
it appealing to model the ambiguity in the detection caused by the high mobility of vehicles
and the collisions in VANET, and (3) The efficiency of Dempster-Shafer in the evidences
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aggregation which made it widely used in many critical fields like investigating crimes and
diseases.
The proposed algorithm works as follows. Initially, each node L is assigned a trustwor-
thiness probability  according to its reputation value.
(L) =
Reputation(L)Pn
j=1Reputation(L)
(3)
where n represents all the neighbor nodes belonging to the same cluster as L. Note that
dividing by the reputation values of the neighboring nodes ensures the fairness among the
nodes. Let’s define a power set 
 composed of three main elements: hypothesis H = C
stating that L is cooperative; hypothesis H = S that it is selfish; and hypothesis U = 

that L is either cooperative or selfish. This latter hypothesis is important to express the
uncertainty in the decisions when some watchdogs are not sure if a node is cooperative
or not. The probability of cooperation assigned to the node being judged is equal to the
trustworthiness probability of the node giving the judgment. This means that if node X ,
which is trustworthy with probability , states that node Y is cooperative, then the primary
probability assignments of node X are:
 m1(H) = (X)
 m1( H) = 0
 m1(U) = 1  (X)
In contrary, if the nodeX claims that Y is uncooperative, then the basic probability assign-
ments of node X are:
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 m1(H) = 0
 m1( H) = (X)
 m1(U) = 1  (X).
The combination rule for the gathered evidences is expressed in terms of belief in trust-
worthiness function:
bel(H) =
X
j:AjH
m(Aj) (4)
where H represents a hypothesis. The above function may be resolved by combining each
pair of beliefs. This can be done as follows [45]:
m1(H)m2(H) = 1K [m1(H)m2(H) +m1(H)m2(U) +m1(U)m2(H)]
m1( H)m2( H) = 1K [m1( H)m2( H) +m1( H)m2(U) +m1(U)m2( H)]
Where:
K =
X
B\C=?
m1(B)m2(C) (5)
Dempster-Shafer results in a judgment value between 0 and 1 expressing the degree of
belief in that judgment. The motivation behind using Dempster-Shafer is to discount the un-
reliable evidences upon building the final decision. In fact, the majority rule would produce
inaccurate judgement if some nodes build malicious alliances. The averaging model may
be a substitute for the majority rule. However, unreliable watchdogs could produce errors
in the final judgment since this model is strongly vulnerable to outliers. Dempster-ShaferŠs
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advantage here lies in the fact that it excludes evidence from untrustworthy or uncertain ob-
servers and prevents them from beating the trustworthy evidences even they constitute the
majority. Therefore, the use of Dempster-Shafer is able to increase the probability of de-
tection of selfish nodes and decrease the false alarms as shown in Fig. 24 and Fig. 25 In the
following, simulations are conducted to compare two models: the Dempster-Shafer model
and the averaging model. We call the Dempster-Shafer model ‘With Dempster-Shafer” and
the averaging model ‘Without Dempster-Shafer”.
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Figure 24: Probability of detection
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Figure 25: Percentage of false negatives
The probability of detection is obtained by dividing the number of detected selfish nodes
by the real number of selfish nodes. It gives a measure of the efficiency of the proposed
model. As depicted in Fig. 24, we can clearly notice that the use of Dempster-Shafer
increases the detection probability around 20%. This result is expected since the Dempster-
Shafer discounts the untrustworthy votes upon forming the final judgement which augments
the accuracy of the decisions. By discarding the uncertain votes, the proposed model is
increasing hence the number of detected selfish nodes.
False negative occurs when Intrusion Detection System fails to detect an actual attack.
This value is increased whenever an existing attack is not detected. As shown in Fig. 25, the
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“Without Dempster-Shafer” model allows some breaches to occur in this context. In fact,
this scheme allows the selfish nodes to build alliances with some other nodes to gain the
majority of votes. In contrary, the Dempster-Shafer model gives a zero percentage of false
negatives. This is due to the fact that the trustworthiness value built through the payment
mechanism affects the weight of each vote. This trust value gives an accurate assessment
of the nodes since it is a result an accumulated incentive mechanism. This leads to prevent
the inaccurate votes from beating the accurate ones. Thus, even the majority of the nodes
reported the false decision, the weighting remains for the trustworthy decision. This assures
that all the selfish vehicles will be detected and hence the false negative percentage will be
null.
Tit   for   Tat Cooperation Regulation : In this phase, the cooperation among
the nodes is decided according to the aggregated decision; that is, a head or MPR node i
will cooperate with another head or MPR node j if the belief in trustworthiness of node j
is greater than 0:5. Otherwise, it will defect.
Algorithm 9 Cooperation Regulation Phase
1: Initialization:
2: Let i be an elected head or MPR node.
3: Let j be an elected head or MPR node.
4: Let R be a forwarding request from j to i.
5: procedure COOPERATIONREGULATION
6: if belief(j) > 0:5 then
7: i fulfills R
8: else
9: i drops R
10: end if
11: end procedure
Information Dissemination : It’s obvious that the implementation time and the
overhead of the proposed model is somehow high since for each head andMPR there should
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be a monitoring phase, voting phase, and aggregation phase before taking the cooperation
or defection decision. To address this problem, information dissemination principle is em-
ployed to make neighbors share the belief in trustworthiness information of other nodes.
Thus, the selfish nodes will be punished by all of their neighbors (who share the belief of
this node) without having the monitoring, voting, and aggregation phases repeatedly. The
information dissemination phase works as follows: after building the aggregated decision,
each cluster-head propagates the results of the voting to its cluster members. Moreover,
it has to broadcast these results to the other cluster-heads whenever a contact with them
occurs. These cluster-heads, in turn, disseminate this information to all their cluster mem-
bers. Thus, these nodes will no longer cooperate with the propagated selfish nodes if these
latter fall later in their transmission range without launching a new monitoring and voting
procedures. This process allows decreasing the overhead and reducing the implementation
time of the model.
Algorithm 10 Detection Algorithm - Information dissemination
1: Initialization:
2: Let H1 be a cluster head of cluster C1.
3: Let H2 be a cluster head of cluster C2.
4: Let S be a selfish node in cluster C1.
5: Let SelfishSet(H1) be the set of selfish nodes detected within the cluster C1.
6: Let SelfishSet(H2) be the set of selfish nodes detected within the cluster C2.
7: procedure INFORMATIONDISSEMINATION
8: SelfishSet(H1) := S
9: if new contact between H1 and H2 occurs then
10: SelfishSet(H2) := SelfishSet(H2) [ SelfishSet(H1)
11: SelfishSet(H1) := SelfishSet(H1) [ SelfishSet(H2)
12: end if
13: end procedure
Fig. 26, illustrates the progress of the model implementation time as the percentage
of selfish nodes increases in both cases “Without information dissemination” and “With
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information dissemination”. It is obvious that the information dissemination is able to
reduce the implementation time of the model up to 0.3 seconds.
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Figure 26: Model Implementation Time
This idea allows also reducing the overhead caused by the exchange of a large num-
ber of messages. In fact, applying the proposed strategy requires broadcasting messages
to propagate the initial observations of the watchdogs, voting messages to announce the
watchdogs opinions, other messages for the cluster-head to propagate the decision to all
its cluster members, and other bunch of messages for the cluster-head to warn the other
cluster-heads whenever a contact between them occurs. We assume that all these messages
are broadcasted 2-hop away. Thus the total overhead of the model is Ni + Ni + Ni + Ni =
4Ni whereNi represents the number of 2-hop away neighbor nodes. By adopting the infor-
mation dissemination concept, the propagation of watchdogs’ initial observations and votes
phases are eliminated which reduces the overhead to be Ni + Ni = 2Ni with 2Ni < 4Ni.
Fig. 27 shows that the DS-based Tit-for-Tat strategy is as good as the generous strategy
for the cooperative participants in the sense that their gain is close to the optimal upper
bounds. This can be justified by the fact that these nodes will not be punished due to the
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tit-for-tat.eps
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Figure 27: DS Tit-for-Tat
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Figure 28: Selfish vs. Cooperative
high detection probability of the real selfish nodes and the null percentage of false alarms
resulting from the use of Dempster-Shafer. Furthermore, Fig. 28 demonstrates that the
DS-based strategy is able to regulate the cooperation inside the network by rewarding the
cooperative nodes and punishing the selfish nodes. In the figure, we notice that the gain
of cooperative nodes keeps increasing along the time due to the rewards received by the
different nodes while the gain of selfish nodes keeps decreasing along the time due to the
continuous punishments imposed by not only single nodes, but by the different network
nodes instead.
4.3 Illustrative Example
Table 13: QoS metrics values of nodes using the BCDV model
Nodes 1 2 3 4 5 6 12
QoS value 685:8 197 503:2 379:4 316:7 338:7 746:5
Nodes 7 8 9 10 11 13 14
QoS value 308:1 400 234:01 159:54 389:5 797:8 708:76
According to the Bandwidth-Connectivity & Proportional Distance Model (BCDV)
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Table 14: Reputation values of nodes using Reputation value calculation algorithm
Cluster 1
Nodes 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 Total
Initial Reputation 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 700
New Reputation 177:8 100 100 100 100 100 160:7 838:5
Trust  0:21 0:12 0:12 0:12 0:12 0:12 0:19 1
Cluster 2
Nodes 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 Total
Initial Reputation 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 700
New Reputation 100 161:3 100 100 100 189:04 100 850:34
Trust  0:12 0:18 0:12 0:12 0:12 0:22 0:12 1
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Figure 29: Vehicular ad-hoc Network example
(Table 3) which gives the best results in terms of number of MPRs, network stability, end-
to-end delay, and packet delivery ratio as shown in Chapter 3, the Table 13 shows the QoS
values calculated for each node. The initial reputation values of all the nodes are set to
100 as shown in Table 14. Nodes 12 and 13, which have the local maximal QoS values
in their clusters, are elected as cluster-heads for clusters 1 and 2 respectively. After being
elected as cluster-heads, nodes 12 and 13 receive a payment. The payment is calculated
as follows. Node 12 will receive a payment value of Payment(12) = QoS(12) - QoS(1)
= 746:5   685:8 = 60:7 to yield a new reputation of Rep(12) = 100 + 60:7 = 160:7.
Similarly, the node 13 will receive a payment of Payment(13) = QoS(12) - QoS(1) =
797:8 708:76 = 89:04 to yield a new reputation value of Rep(13) = 100+89:04 = 189:04.
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Afterwards, a MPR selection algorithm takes place according to QoS-OLSR selection al-
gorithm. Nodes 1 and 8 are selected as MPRs according to this algorithm. These MPRs
receive also a payment from their voter nodes once selected. According to the example, the
MPRs 1 and 8 connecting the 3-hop away cluster-heads 12 and 13 should be payed. We
need to find the path connecting 12 and 13 and having the second best QoS. In this case, the
path is 1-7 composed of nodes 1 and 7. The payment of the MPRs will be hence the QoS
difference between the two path so that: Payment(1)=Payment(8)=min(QoS(1),QoS(8)) -
min(QoS(1),QoS(7)) = 400-308.1=91.9. Thus, the new reputation value of node 1 becomes
Rep(1) = 100+91.9 = 191.9. Similarly, the node 8will get a reputation of Rep(8)= 100+91.9
= 191.9.
Now, the nodes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 12 will serve as a watchdogs to monitor the behavior
of the MPR node 1. These nodes can overhear all the incoming/outcoming packets from/to
node 1 since this latter falls in their transmission ranges. Suppose that the node 1 has to
send a packet p1 to the node 8. The watchdog nodes estimate the expected time the packet
should take in order to reach its destination, let’s say 30 ms. Then, after the expiry of this
delay, the watchdogs check if the packet has been received to the potential destination using
the buffer they maintain. If they finds that the packet was received, they mark the node 1 as
“good”. Otherwise, they mark the node 1 as “suspicious”. Suppose that watchdogs 3 and
6 reported that vehicle 1 is suspicious. Then, all the watchdogs share their observations to
make the final decision on this MPR. They have now to aggregate the observations using
Dempster-Shafer. We give in the following an example of how the aggregation is done
between two watchdogs. Assume in our example that the first watchdog claims that vehicle
1 is selfish with a probability of 0.99 and that this watchdog is uncertain of its decision with
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probability of 0.01 (denoted by m1(S) and m1(U), respectively). The second watchdog
states that 1 is cooperative with a probability of 0.99 and is uncertain of its decision with
probability of 0.01 (denoted by m2(C) and m2(U), respectively). The beliefs are then
represented as follows:
 Watchdog 1 :
m1(S) = 0:99 (Vehicle 1 is selfish)
m1(U) = 0:01 (watchdog 1 is uncertain)
m1(C) = 0 (M is cooperative)
 Watchdog 2 :
m2(C) = 0:99 (Vehicle 1 is cooperative)
m2(S) = 0:01 (Vehicle 1 is selfish)
m2(U) = 0 (watchdog 2 is uncertain)
The combination of the beliefs with the two watchdogs is summarized in Table 15.
Table 15: Dempster Combination of Watchdog 1 and Watchdog 2
W2
W1
Selfish=0.99 Cooperative=0 Uncertain=0.01
Selfish=0.01 m1(S)m2(S) = 0:0099 m1(C)m2(S) = 0 m1(U)m2(S) = 0:0001
Cooperative=0.99 m1(S)m2(C) = 0:9801 m1(C)m2(C) = 0 m1(U)m2(C) = 0:0099
Uncertain=0 m1(S)m2(U) = 0 m1(C)m2(U) = 0 m1(U)m2(U) = 0
Using Equations 4 and 5:
 Multiplying the beliefs from intersected row and column yields the combined proba-
bility , e.g.,m12(S) = (0:99)(0:01) = 0:0099.
 The empty intersections represent a conflict.
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 The single nonzero value is for the combination of Selfish,m12(S) = (0:99)(0:01) =
0:0099.
 To calculate K, we multiply the empty intersections that represent conflicts. Using
Equation 5, K = (0.99)(0.99) + (0.01)(0.01) + (0.01)(0.99) = 0.9901.
 Using Equation 4,m1(S)m2(S) = (0:99)(0:01)=[1  0:9901] = 1.
The basic probability assignment for the selfishness of vehicle 1 turns out Bel(S) = 1
although there is many conflicting beliefs. The vehicle 1 is marked then as selfish. Now,
the cluster head node 12 spreads this decision to the cluster-head node 13 whenever a
contact between them occurs to may, in its turn, inform its cluster members (7,9,10,11,14)
in order to accelerate the detection procedure. Thus, if the vehicle 1 gets the cluster scope
of any of the Cluster 2 members, they will directly refrain from electing it or cooperating
with it without the need of new monitoring and voting mechanisms.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we addressed the problem of misbehaving nodes in Vehicular Ad Hoc Net-
works. We showed that the presence of these nodes have a negative impact on the network
stability, lifetime, overhead, and delay. Therefore, we proposed a Dempster-Shafer base
model that is able to (1) detect the misbehaving vehicles after the clusters are formed,
and (2) regulate the cooperation. The detection is done in a cooperative manner where
evidences from different watchdogs are gathered and aggregated using Dempster-Shafer.
Thereafter, we proposed three strategies based on Tit-for-Tat to regulate the cooperation.
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The strategies are: generous Tit-for-Tat, Tit-for-k-Tats, and Dempster-Shafer based Tit-for-
Tat. Simulation results reveal that the Dempster-Shafer based strategy is the best to enforce
the cooperation in the presence of high mobility and channel collisions. The Dempster-
Shafer based Tit-for-Tat is composed of five phases: reputation calculation, watchdogs
monitoring, votes aggregation, Tit-for-Tat cooperation regulation, and information dissem-
ination. Empirical results show that the proposed model is able to regulate the cooperation
inside the vehicular network by rewarding the cooperative nodes and punishing the selfish
nodes. They show also that the model increases the probability of detection up to 40%,
and annuls the false negatives while maintaining a minimized implementation time and
overhead.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Vehicular ad hoc network is an emerging wireless technology that is supposed to provide a
wide set of safety and commercial applications and services. The main issue in such kind of
networks is providing efficient and secure communications. Thus, we proposed in Chapter
3 a clustering model that organizes the network architecture followed by a routing model
responsible for optimizing the communications. The clustering was done by proposing a
QoS function that considers the mobility metrics such as velocity and distance and the QoS
requirements such as bandwidth and connectivity. The routing was done by using an Ant
Colony Optimization algorithm responsible for performing a proactive discovery to select
the best paths in terms of stability, QoS, and delay. Performance analysis and simulation
results prove that the proposed clustering and routing models are able to extend the network
lifetime up to 12%, reduce the percentage of selected MPRs by 20%, increase the packet
delivery ratio by 10%, and decrease the path length up to 2-hops. They show also that these
models present an acceptable percentage of bandwidth average difference. However, some
vehicles might misbehave after clusters formation by refusing to follow the models’ rules.
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Therefore, we developed in Chapter 4 the VANET-DSDmodel that detects the misbehaving
vehicles, and regulates the cooperation. The detection is done in a cooperative manner
where the evidences are collected by the different clusters nodes and the aggregation is
accomplished using Dempster-Shafer. In the light of the detection results, the cooperation
regulation phase employs the Tit-for-Tat strategy to reward the cooperative vehicles and
punish the misbehaving ones. Simulations results show that the VANET-DSDmodel is able
to regulate the cooperation by accurately rewarding the cooperative nodes and punishing
the selfish nodes. They show also that the model increases the probability of detection up
to 40%, and annuls the false negatives while maintaining a minimized implementation time
and overhead.
In summary, the main contributions of our thesis are:
1. Optimizing the network architecture by forming homogeneous and long-living clus-
ters.
2. Extending the vehicular network lifetime while maintaining the Quality of Service.
3. Improving the communications among clusters and reducing the overhead.
4. Detecting the misbehaving nodes after clusters formation.
5. Regulating the cooperation within the network.
The research presented in this thesis tackled the problem of clustering in Vehicular Ad
Hoc Networks in the presence of passive malicious nodes. There are several research topics
emerging from this work which should be continued.
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Actually, the presence of active malicious nodes would hinder the application of the
clustering models and would degrade the network performance considerably. These nodes
that have the intention to harm the network may launch several attacks such as denial of
service, and sybil attack.
Our future work will be detecting and punishing the active malicious nodes knowing
that the detection of the active malicious nodes is more challenging than the passive ones
since the former are more professional and have the intention to harm the network.
The following is the list of journal articles submissions derived from the thesis work:
 Omar Abdel Wahab, Hadi Otrok, Azzam Mourad. “A Dempster-Shafer based Tit-
for-Tat Strategy to Regulate the Cooperation in VANET using QoS-OLSR Protocol”,
to the journal of Wireless Personal Communications, Springer, 2012 (Under Second
Round of Minor Reviews).
 Omar Abdel Wahab, Hadi Otrok, Azzam Mourad. “VANET QoS-OLSR: QoS-based
Clustering Protocol for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks”, to the journal of Computer
Communications , Elsevier, 2012 (Under Second Round of Minor Reviews).
 Omar Abdel Wahab, Hadi Otrok, Azzam Mourad .“ A Cooperative Watchdog Model
Based on Dempster-Shafer for Detecting Misbehaving Vehicles”, to the journal of
Computer Communications , Elsevier, 2012 (Under Review).
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